The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002 was a decisive moment in understanding the balance of power within Turkey and the positioning of influential actors at home.
Many researchers argue that the term “deep state” in Turkey goes back decades. Its outlines were formed by military, political, and security elites after the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The army, in particular, considered itself the guardian of Atatürk’s principles, especially secularism and nationalism. This self-assigned role led to repeated military interventions in politics through successive coups.
In contrast, the concept of the “New Ottomans” emerged as a political direction under the AKP and its leader President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It reflects a strategic outlook aimed at restoring Turkish influence in territories once under Ottoman rule, particularly in the Middle East and the Balkans.
With Erdoğan’s arrival to power, his central strategy was to neutralise the traditional deep state and dismantle networks within the army and judiciary. Over time, however, some observers began to see these measures as the basis for a new, Erdoğan-style version of the deep state.
According to Turkish researcher Mehmet Rakib Oğlu, speaking to +963, the deep state in Turkey is not widely examined in academic literature, yet it remains present in the collective memory and political discourse. He explains that the deep state refers to hidden and unofficial centres of power that surpass the authority of elected governments, intersect with official institutions, but also operate through shadowy channels.
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The term “deep” suggests something invisible or undeclared, while the word “state” is not limited to the bureaucracy. It also includes forces acting with state authority: the military, judiciary, business elites, and the media. Thus, the deep state is not merely security agencies but extends to the economy, society, and communication.
Historically, Oğlu traces its roots back to the late Ottoman period, when secret societies and some Western-linked Masonic lodges helped shape political undercurrents. The tradition continued after the Republic’s foundation, as the legacy of the Committee of Union and Progress persisted within state bureaucracy.
During the Cold War, NATO-linked “counter-guerilla” structures, alongside military coups and emergency rule, reinforced the deep state. The coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, as well as the “28 February Process” in 1997, are clear examples of this intervention.
The military was the central actor. It saw itself as the “founding elite” and protector of secularism. For example, in 1997, the army worked with the media, judiciary, and business elites to force an elected government to resign. Women wearing headscarves were barred from universities, “persuasion rooms” pressured them to remove the veil, and media campaigns amplified the state’s narrative. This shows that the deep state shaped not only politics but also social life.
After 2002, the AKP’s rise weakened traditional deep state networks. The “Ergenekon” and “Sledgehammer” trials reduced the power of Kemalist cadres in the military and judiciary. Erdoğan’s government consolidated control, while the failed coup attempt of July 2016 marked the last major attempt by deep state factions to reclaim authority. Its failure, thanks to popular mobilisation, placed Erdoğan firmly as the strongest arbiter of state institutions and allowed him to restructure the deep state under his control.
Oğlu stresses that the deep state has not disappeared. Rather, power balances within it have shifted. Where Kemalists once justified intervention in the name of protecting secularism, today’s security and political networks function under the ruling authority. Erdoğan’s supporters argue that this “new deep state” serves the people and Islamic identity, unlike the Kemalist version associated with repression and exclusion. For this reason, he concludes, the deep state in Turkey should not be seen as a fixed structure but as a shifting balance of forces that evolves with political power.
The concept of the deep state in Turkey is closely tied to structures of authority; before and after the AKP era alike. It reflects the dynamic relationship between the political regime and the state’s “hard” institutions. This means the deep state cannot be considered abolished, only redefined according to the nature of the regime in contemporary Turkey.
Turkish writer İslam Özkan, speaking to +963, defines the deep state as a network of unelected actors and institutions that continue to make decisions or implement policies outside the boundaries of democratic accountability. At times, they intervene directly to shape political outcomes. In the Turkish context, it describes a “parallel power” operating through covert or unaccountable means.
He highlights the importance of historical factors: repeated military coups entrenched a culture of intervention, supported by both internal and external forces. The military was sometimes part of the deep state, sometimes its target, but always a central actor within its power web. Informal alliances between the army, judiciary, and business elites lay at the heart of deep state dynamics, enabling privileged funding, legally protected contracts, and secret operations.
Decision-making in Turkey, Özkan explains, depends on the nature of the issue. Some decisions are taken directly by President Erdoğan, while others remain within the purview of the deep state, a bureaucracy of military and civilian elites.
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Today, Erdoğan’s authority largely overshadows the deep state. Yet some sensitive issues, especially foreign policy, still involve strong input from entrenched bureaucrats. Relations between Erdoğan and the deep state are now marked by cooperation and coordination, even partnership. His popular support strengthens the deep state, while it in turn provides leverage in sensitive files and elections. At the same time, Erdoğan relies on it to bolster his political and administrative control.
However, Özkan notes that Erdoğan’s popularity has declined in recent years, potentially opening the way for the deep state to distance itself from him if its interests demand. The relationship, therefore, is one of “mutual pragmatic partnership”: each side needs the other depending on shifting political conditions.
The AKP’s impact on the deep state can be traced through phases. In the first stage (2002–2010), the party used judicial and political tools to weaken traditional deep state actors, diminishing military and bureaucratic dominance. In the later stage (2013–2016), dismantling old networks made room for new ones: the AKP cultivated its own networks of businessmen, judicial circles, and media allies.
Özkan concludes that state institutions have been eroded, with decision-making shifting to Erdoğan’s inner circle. The deep state has not been dismantled but reconstituted, replacing old Kemalist networks with new ones loyal to the executive. In this sense, Erdoğan reduced the influence of the traditional deep state while creating a version aligned with his authority.
