The visit of Syria’s interim president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, to Moscow and his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin reflects a shared attempt to recalibrate Russian–Syrian relations in response to Syria’s transitional moment and rapidly evolving regional dynamics. Rather than signalling a return to inherited alliances from the Assad era, the visit points to a more pragmatic approach, based on mutual interests and a functional division of roles.
For Moscow, the priority appears to be supporting a controlled path towards stability while reassessing its military, security, and economic footprint in Syria at the lowest possible cost. This approach emphasises selective engagement, focusing on areas of strategic value – notably the coast and the south – while avoiding deeper involvement in open-ended conflicts. Damascus, meanwhile, is seeking to construct balanced relationships with international actors, grounded in cooperation rather than political dependency, and to leverage Russia’s influence in specific areas such as security coordination, reconstruction, and energy. In doing so, the Syrian leadership aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the new state and secure time and space to manage a fragile transition in an increasingly multipolar international environment.
On Wednesday, President Putin received President Al-Sharaa at the Kremlin in what was the latter’s second official visit since assuming office. The timing is significant, coming amid accelerated political and security changes inside Syria and a dense web of regional and international calculations shaping the post-Assad landscape.
Support for stability, not a revival of old alliances
During the meeting, President Putin stressed that Russia remains committed to developing relations with Syria across a range of sectors, highlighting what he described as the “deep roots” of bilateral ties. He also reaffirmed Moscow’s support for Syria’s territorial unity and sovereignty, noting that Russia is closely following the efforts of the interim government to restore control over Syrian territory.
President Al-Sharaa, for his part, expressed hope that the talks would produce practical results, underlining Russia’s continued importance in supporting stability. He noted that Syria had navigated a series of complex challenges over the past year, culminating in efforts to unify the country’s territory after years of fragmentation.
According to Ezzat Baghdadi, an independent diplomat based in Vienna, the visit should not be read as an attempt to revive alliances associated with the rule of Bashar al-Assad. Speaking to +963, he argued that the new Syrian leadership is approaching Russia through a pragmatic framework based on clearly defined roles rather than ideological alignment.
Baghdadi emphasised that Damascus is not seeking a comprehensive strategic patron but rather partners capable of helping to manage regional risks and prevent certain areas from becoming permanent flashpoints during a highly sensitive transitional period.
This assessment is echoed by Dr Ismail Turki, professor of international relations at Cairo University, who told +963 that the visit reflects the contours of what Syrian officials describe as a “new Syria”. In his view, this approach is built on balanced relations with multiple international actors – including the United States and Europe – while maintaining cooperation with Russia under conditions fundamentally different from those that prevailed before the fall of the former regime
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Economy and reconstruction: shared interests and cautious engagement
On the economic front, President Putin stated that bilateral economic cooperation has begun to move beyond stagnation, particularly in trade. He stressed the importance of preserving this momentum and confirmed that Russian companies, especially in the construction sector, are ready to participate in Syria’s reconstruction.
President Al-Sharaa described the passing of one year since the first Russian delegation visited Syria after the political transition as a symbolic turning point – marking a shift from destruction towards stability and recovery.
Wael Alwan, a researcher at the Jusoor for Studies, told +963 that this economic engagement reflects Moscow’s broader support for the stabilisation path pursued by the new Syrian government. He noted that Russia has begun translating political support into practical measures, including the repositioning of its forces in line with ongoing negotiations with Damascus.
According to Alwan, Russia’s approach extends beyond diplomatic backing in international forums to encompass key internal files, particularly in the security, military, and economic spheres. He added that the relationship is increasingly shaped by an alignment of interests rather than mutual goodwill. Moscow, he argued, recognises the need to redefine its ties with Syria’s new leadership in ways that safeguard Russian strategic interests while offering Damascus tangible gains.
These gains, Alwan explained, are not limited to military or security cooperation. They also include economic and developmental dimensions such as arms maintenance, energy infrastructure, and continued coordination on food security.
Russian military presence redeployment rather than withdrawal
Alongside the political discussions, the Kremlin confirmed that the future of Russia’s military presence in Syria was among the topics addressed, while declining to comment on the fate of former president Bashar al-Assad.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the talks were held in the format of a working breakfast, followed by a separate bilateral meeting, and covered both bilateral cooperation and regional developments.
These statements coincide with notable developments on the ground. Russian forces have begun withdrawing from Qamishli airport and their base in the city, relocating personnel and equipment to positions in Latakia province. Reports suggest that some forces may be transferred to the Hmeimim airbase, while others could return to Russia.
Baghdadi views this move not as a strategic retreat, but as a calculated redeployment. He argues that Moscow is adjusting its posture in response to Turkey’s expanding influence in northern Syria, particularly in security, economic, and administrative terms. From this perspective, Russia has effectively ceded the north to Turkish arrangements in exchange for consolidating its presence in areas where the strategic return is higher and the operational cost lower.
The south and the coast: managing risk and calibrated influence
Baghdadi further explains that southern Syria occupies a particularly sensitive position in Russia’s calculations due to its proximity to Israel. In this context, Moscow’s role is less about asserting sovereignty and more about managing risk and preventing escalation. This, he suggests, restores Russia’s function as an indirect security actor rather than a dominant power on the ground.
From the south, Russia’s focus extends towards the coast, where it seeks to secure its military and strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean within a legal framework that ensures long-term legitimacy. The emphasis here is on stability and predictability rather than expansion.
Dr Turki agrees, noting that Moscow is now working to establish an institutional relationship with the Syrian state itself, rather than with a particular regime. This involves legal and security arrangements that provide a clear basis for Russia’s continued presence at the Hmeimim and Tartous bases, while preserving its strategic interests in the Mediterranean. He adds that Moscow is fully aware that the rules of engagement have changed following recent territorial shifts and the redeployment of government forces under the 18 January agreement.
Regional security and counterterrorism
Turki also highlights that Russia’s flexibility and political realism amount to de facto recognition of the new Syrian leadership. Moscow, he argues, is backing Damascus’s attempt to balance relations between East and West, while ensuring that Syria remains a key platform for Russia’s access to the Mediterranean.
At the same time, the security file – particularly counter-terrorism – remains central to Russian interests. Moscow continues to view Syria as a critical arena for containing militant networks, especially given the presence of fighters originating from former Soviet republics.
In conclusion, Turki argues that President Al-Sharaa’s visit sends a clear message: Russia has not exited Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Instead, it remains an active actor, adapting its approach and seeking to build functional partnerships with the new leadership to shape security and political balances during a highly sensitive transitional phase.
