The Syrian coast constitutes one of the most sensitive regions in the post-Assad era, not only because of its geographic location and its economic and military importance, but also due to deep political and social accumulations formed over decades of rule by the ousted regime.
This region stands out as a space where security concerns intersect with political, economic, and social questions. On the one hand, there are real fears among segments of the population of revenge or collective exclusion, in light of a heavy legacy of forced association between the local community and the ousted regime. On the other hand, the transitional government faces a major challenge in asserting control and preventing the coast from turning into a hotspot of tension and a site for reproducing old networks of influence.
The coastal file cannot, at this stage, be reduced to a narrow security approach alone. It requires a comprehensive reading that recognizes the diversity of the society there and the differences in what individuals and groups did during the years of Assad’s rule, between those who were part of the structure of power and those who were not. It also requires shedding light on a frank approach to transitional justice as the primary entry point for building trust, through a clear distinction between individual criminal responsibility for crimes and collective rights that must not be infringed upon.
In a special interview with +963, Ammar Jello, a researcher at the Dialogue Institute for Research and Studies, answered many questions, most notably: Is the problem on the coast security related, economic, or political? Is it internal or external? And is the movement on the coast against the government “legitimate,” especially given that the region previously stood, for the most part, against any peaceful opposition movement?
The full interview follows:
Is the Syrian coast a supportive environment for former officers and members of the ousted regime, or is what is being portrayed exaggerated?
The coastal region, in its primary environment, includes a large number of officers or what can be described as remnants of the former regime, due to several factors, including the demographic extension, given that senior leaders in the Assad regime are from the Alawite sect. The second aspect is that these individuals have a popular base in this region due to kinship factors, which is extremely important with regard to the ability to hide and move easily in that area, which is characterized by its geography, with an abundance of mountains, thickets, and forests, facilitating entrenchment for these groups, in addition to its proximity to the Lebanese border, which is largely uncontrolled and through which arms and fighters are smuggled from both sides, as previously revealed by the American newspaper The New York Times.
There is an exaggeration in portraying the size of the regime’s remnants on the coast, and I believe this is intentional rather than random by some local and external actors. All the circulated figures of former Assad regime officers as active players managing cells and groups of remnants on the coast are greatly exaggerated. These individuals fell militarily with the fall of the regime.
After the protests and demonstrations, is the problem on the coast security related, economic, or political? Internal or external?
The problem on the coast is multiple, complex, and intertwined: security, political, and economic. There are also security problems that accompany the birth of regimes, when conditions are chaotic and matters take on political and sectarian dimensions. The economic dimension constitutes the core issue, as coastal residents are currently most concerned with the economic and living situation, which is an extremely important factor and was one of the reasons that led to the recent demonstrations on the coast.
It is necessary that Alawites on the coast not become victims of the legacy of the former regime, which was characterized by criminality and multiple repressive tools across all sects, but was symbolically associated with a sect, given the existence of a narrow circle accessible only to Alawite individuals close to the authority of the Assad family.
The problem on the coast is largely internal, despite the presence of external actors such as Russia and Iran that supported the regime. However, it is wrong to say that Alawites rely on Russia, and the same applies to Iran, which previously failed to penetrate the Alawite sect through the spread of Shi’ism, a failure that continues today. Iran does not have a popular base on the coast, and particularly not among Alawites. I believe that the coastal events that occurred last March were a message from Russia to the new government stating: “We are present and we have interests on the coast that we wish to preserve as before.”
How can the Syrian coast be a tool for unifying the country or the opposite, based on differing ideological and sectarian backgrounds?
It is very possible for the coast to be a tool for unifying the country due to its diversity and the multiplicity of its religious and ethnic components. It is also important for the government to work on reordering priorities on the coast by drawing a new picture that conveys that Alawites on the coast and in Syria in general do not bear the “burden” of what the former regime did. The criminal individual will be brought to justice, while the Alawite citizen who did not commit any crimes must live a normal life, on an equal footing with other Syrian citizens from all components.
The Alawite sect must play an important role by handing over those involved from the ousted regime to justice and the judiciary, rather than covering up for them. I also stress the need to move forward with transitional justice and to begin trials against those involved, as happened weeks ago in Aleppo through public trials of officers and members of the ousted regime.
Do you see the movement on the coast against the government as “legitimate,” especially since the region previously stood, for the most part, against any peaceful opposition movement?
Peaceful movement, according to all laws and constitutions, is a legitimate movement. The recent peaceful demonstrations on the coast were a confrontation among segments of society themselves, not between protesters and the government. There remains a degree of sensitivity among segments of coastal society as a result of the practices of the ousted regime, including accusations of treason and similar behavior.
The government must be positive in dealing with demonstrations against it, while emphasizing the protection of protesters and avoiding a repetition of what happened days ago in Latakia, where violent clashes occurred between pro government and anti government demonstrators.
How can national identity be redefined away from linking the coast to the ousted regime?
Many countries in the region have failed to establish an inclusive national identity, including Syria over the past decades, and even before the Assad regime came to power, as ruling parties in Syria were essentially “regional layers” that created divisions, for example, between city and countryside.
At present, we need to rebuild an inclusive national identity among all Syrians, despite their different components, to bridge the gap between segments of society, and to work on strengthening laws based on equality among all citizens in rights and duties. All of this will be consolidated over a period that is not short, and may extend for decades.
What form of transitional justice is acceptable on the Syrian coast?
Acceptable transitional justice is certainly that which is based on holding accountable those involved in crimes and violations during the era of the former regime, as well as those who committed violations from armed factions during the past period. Complete justice without exception is what is acceptable on the coast and in the rest of Syria, and any entity or party that does not accept transitional justice will be rejected by all.
The current government has undertaken a radical change in its previous structure and has been highly open internally and externally, in a way that even the most optimistic did not expect. Much of the fear on the coast toward the government stems from the loss of influence by many individuals affiliated with the former regime, who have begun sending messages that they will not relinquish their status as “first class Syrian citizens.”
