Protests that swept across 26 Iranian provinces and erupted from Tehran’s Grand Bazaar in late December 2025 have entered a new phase, marked by an external political escalation following US President Donald Trump’s warning that Washington could intervene if demonstrators are violently suppressed. The remarks coincided with coordinated protests in several Iranian cities, prompting a swift response from Tehran, which warned against any American interference, framing it as a gateway to regional chaos and rejecting what it described as foreign tutelage, while mocking “US rescue experiments”.
The protests carry particular symbolic weight due to their origin in the bazaar, historically a cornerstone of the alliance between Iran’s commercial class and the religious establishment. Their eruption reflects the erosion of that relationship under the combined pressures of sanctions, currency collapse and deepening social crisis. Against the backdrop of rising US–Iranian tensions and the possibility of Israeli exploitation of the moment, military scenarios appear governed more by political timing and cost calculations than by an imminent decision for war.
Targeting the branches
Kamal al-Zaghoul, a researcher in international affairs, told +963 that the United States has returned to a strategy he describes as “striking the branches before the core”, aimed at reducing the strategic cost should Washington eventually decide to confront Iran directly.
Al-Zaghoul noted that this approach is not new. It was clearly visible during Trump’s first term, when the US targeted Iranian-linked sites in Iraq, assassinated Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and carried out repeated strikes on Iranian positions in Syria. He argued that the strategy has resurfaced following the recent direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, which lasted around 12 days and, in his assessment, demonstrated the limited effectiveness of striking the “centre” without neutralising the peripheral networks.
Even if the United States were to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, al-Zaghoul said, the results would likely be constrained, as Tehran has dispersed enriched uranium across multiple locations. Targeting the “core” without dismantling the “branches” would therefore be a strategically flawed move.
These branches, he stressed, pose a direct threat to Israel, Washington’s key regional ally. Leaving them intact would keep the Middle East locked in a state of chronic instability. Iran, he added, continues to rely on these networks – including Hezbollah and the Houthis – as primary tools for projecting power and exporting its revolutionary model.
Al-Zaghoul suggested that when Tehran sensed Hezbollah approaching a dangerous level of attrition, it coordinated with the group to de-escalate and accept indirect understandings with Israel, preserving a minimum level of strength for future use. In military terms, he described these groups as “defensive belts” that shield the Iranian centre.
In this context, he argued, Washington continues to operate according to a “base-to-pyramid” logic: degrading Iran’s regional extensions gradually rather than confronting Tehran head-on.
A green light dynamic
Al-Zaghoul also pointed to what he described as a recurring pattern in Israeli–US coordination, arguing that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu often returns from visits to Washington with a tacit green light to conduct limited strikes in the region. He cited Trump’s first term, when high-level security meetings involving US and Israeli officials – with Russian representation – were followed by direct attacks on Iran’s regional allies.
He said Netanyahu’s recent meeting with Trump in Florida, at the Mar-a-Lago resort, was followed by Israeli strikes inside Lebanon despite existing understandings with Hezbollah, reinforcing the view that this approach remains unchanged.
According to al-Zaghoul, the most likely scenario is the continued targeting of Iran’s regional proxies as a means of pressuring Tehran towards a political settlement. Should Iran accept the terms of a broader understanding, a comprehensive attack would likely be avoided. If, however, it persists in supporting its allies, the prospect of a future strike would remain on the table – though no final decision has yet been made.
He added that Trump continues to prioritise other domestic and international files, and that any military escalation in the Middle East carries risks not comparable to US interventions in Latin America, where Washington enjoys near-total dominance. The Middle East, by contrast, he said, is shaped by deeply rooted cultures of resistance, as demonstrated in Gaza and elsewhere, where local actors have withstood far superior military forces.
Al-Zaghoul concluded that the United States is currently applying maximum pressure by gradually weakening Hezbollah, paving the way for understandings in Lebanon, while keeping the option of striking Iran open. That option, however, remains contingent on several variables, including Iran’s internal situation, the trajectory of street protests, and the potential impact of any strike on global oil markets and the world economy.
For now, he said, Washington is proceeding with caution, granting Israel latitude to strike Iran’s proxies while deferring any broader decision.
Protests and international calculations
Abdulrahman Al-Haidari, spokesperson for the Arab Democratic National Current in Ahvaz, told +963 that protests have expanded across multiple Iranian regions and cities. He said Trump’s threat to intervene in the event of a violent crackdown draws on the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect”, adopted in international law in 2005, which assigns the international community a duty to protect civilians from grave crimes, including crimes against humanity.
While direct military intervention may be difficult, Al-Haidari argued that recent US actions in Venezuela demonstrate that American threats should not be dismissed as rhetorical. He suggested Iran’s official responses are largely aimed at domestic audiences, reflecting the regime’s awareness of Washington’s seriousness.
According to Al-Haidari, Tehran now faces two stark options: allowing protests to continue, risking their expansion and potential regime collapse, or suppressing them by force, which could trigger confrontation with the United States. Israel, he added, views the protests as an opportunity to weaken Iran regionally and curtail its nuclear and missile programmes.
Former head of the Americas desk at Iraqi intelligence, Salem Al-Jumaili, offered a more cautious reading. He told +963 that the verbal escalation between Trump and Tehran should be understood primarily through the lens of deterrence rather than as a prelude to full-scale war. Historically, he said, public threats have often been used to improve negotiating positions or exert psychological pressure, particularly during election cycles or diplomatic deadlock.
Nevertheless, Al-Jumaili warned that the risk of a limited confrontation remains, especially if heightened rhetoric coincides with miscalculated incidents on the ground. As for the protests, he argued that while they exert pressure on the Iranian leadership, they do not in themselves constitute a trigger for external military action.
Past experience, he noted, suggests that regimes facing internal crises tend to tighten security and avoid major wars that could exacerbate internal fractures. Still, Western and Israeli actors may factor the protests into broader calculations aimed at weakening Iran, even if they do not serve as a legal or political justification for war.
Israel, Al-Jumaili concluded, stands to benefit most from a controlled escalation or a prolonged climate of tension with Iran. Tel Aviv has spent years expanding its “target bank” against Iranian assets, both inside Iran and across the region, and may use the current exchange of threats to justify intelligence operations or limited strikes – while remaining firmly below the threshold of full-scale war.
