It would be a mistake to overlook the fact that Syria’s accession to the international coalition against ISIS represents an urgent security and economic necessity for President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s government. Militarily, the new Syrian forces suffer from a clear shortage of technological tools and intelligence capabilities required to pursue ISIS cells that have re-emerged across the Syrian desert and parts of the south. December witnessed a notable escalation in what were described as “co-ordinated” operations between Damascus and the coalition – resulting in US airstrikes on nearly seventy ISIS sites in central Syria, alongside joint raids that led to the killing or arrest of dozens of senior figures within the organisation.
Yet Damascus is pursuing objectives that extend beyond the military dimension. Chief among them is the pursuit of international legitimacy it still lacks – legitimacy it hopes to elevate into the status of a “trusted partnership”. In doing so, Damascus may find it easier to undercut the position of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose long-standing claim to relevance has rested on the banner of counter-terrorism – a banner that would now be firmly in the hands of the government.
Al-Sharaa also appears to have grasped, during his recent US visit, that foreign investment will not flow without full security stabilisation and the normalisation of relations with major powers – conditions the international coalition can provide.
But the cost appears steep. The trap of strategic taming lies at Damascus’s gates, while the US–Israeli game of control continues. The very notion of “taming” captures the essence of the Western – and particularly American – approach towards Damascus. Rather than attempting to overthrow al-Sharaa and plunging Syria into renewed chaos, the Washington–Tel Aviv axis has opted for a strategy of effective containment – transforming the Syrian president from a rising rebel leader into a “security proxy” in exchange for remaining in power. It is a recycled formula from the era of Hafez al-Assad – one rooted in a harsh realism Donald Trump is particularly inclined to practise, especially in dealing with Arab leaders.
Following the high-profile Riyadh meeting in May, US demands became clear. Al-Sharaa was expected to restrain or deport foreign fighters affiliated with transnational jihadist groups, to integrate into the Abraham Accords through normalisation with Israel – or, at the very least, to enter binding security arrangements guaranteeing calm along the southern front – and to open Syria’s security files to Western intelligence services to pursue remnants of al-Qaeda and ISIS. The lifting of economic sanctions in June served as Washington’s “carrot”, while Israel brandished the “stick” of military incursions and support for Druze separatist actors in the south, particularly after Al-Sharaa accused Tel Aviv of “fighting ghosts and fomenting unrest in Suwayda”.
That accusation was hardly unfounded. Israel has long played the “minorities card” as a potent tool of strategic taming via Suwayda, seeking to prevent Damascus from fully consolidating control over southern Syria and ensuring that the government remains in constant need of negotiation with Tel Aviv to maintain stability.
None of this, however, negates the most serious challenge facing the new Syrian state – the deep entrenchment of jihadist ideology within its own structures. While Al-Sharaa seeks to present himself as a moderate statesman, the core of the military power he relies upon remains composed of factions and fighters steeped in Salafi-jihadist thought over many years.
When the Syrian government reached an agreement with the United States in April to integrate Uyghur, Uzbek and Caucasian fighters into the army rather than deport them – under the justification of preventing transnational terrorist activity and transforming them into adherents of “Madkhali Salafism”, grounded in absolute obedience to the ruler – ISIS found its opening. The organisation invested heavily in portraying Al-Sharaa’s actions as a betrayal of his own camp, launching a fierce ideological and media campaign to fracture the state’s social base. It accused him of “breaking allegiance” and “collaboration with the Crusaders”, deploying religious rhetoric designed to resonate with fighters alienated by images of al-Sharaa alongside Donald Trump.
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Operationally, ISIS shifted away from territorial control, favouring social destabilisation as a means of exhausting the state – a strategy that simultaneously justifies broader coalition intervention. The result is further taming, further weakening, and the possibility of eventual disposal should al-Sharaa fail to maintain control. Even the mere discourse surrounding ISIS’s return is enough to frighten risk-averse capital away from Syria, undermining Al-Sharaa’s wager that economic recovery could resolve ideological and sectarian fractures.
Damascus has sought to market itself as a platform for co-operation and growth – a strategic trade corridor linking East and West. Yet any major ISIS attack would return the country to square one, leaving al-Sharaa isolated in the face of a merciless convergence of popular, ideological and jihadist anger.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of +963.
