The agreement signed on 10 March 2025 between the Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, General Mazloum Abdi, and the Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa has become one of the most central issues in the Syrian landscape following the fall of the Assad regime. The agreement, which consists of eight clauses, was not merely a temporary political understanding. Rather, many regarded it as a serious attempt to rebuild the political and social balance in the country and to open a path that could be built upon to rescue Syria as a state and as a people after decades of authoritarianism and the absence of political logic.
Supporters of the agreement argue that its provisions constitute a foundation for reshaping the state on the basis of partnership and pluralism and for containing the deep divisions left by the collapse of the regime, especially in light of the dangerous events witnessed in the coastal regions and the accompanying killings and widespread targeting of Alawite citizens. These events have brought back to the forefront fundamental questions about the nature of the future state and its role in protecting all Syrians without discrimination and in ensuring that the country does not slide into a logic of revenge and collective violence.
Despite the importance of all eight clauses, the agreement faces real difficulties in implementation, primarily due to a distorted political environment characterized by sharp polarization, a heavy legacy of grievances, and a lack of trust produced by long decades of dictatorship, exclusion, and the absence of political life. This reality is directly reflected in the course of implementing the agreement and its eventual outcomes.
In this context, the fourth clause related to the integration of civil and military institutions, border crossings, the airport, and oil fields has emerged as a central focus in the discourse of the transitional authority and media outlets aligned with it. This focus cannot be separated from the economic dimension of the issue, as crossings and resources are directly linked to financial revenues at a time when the remaining political and constitutional clauses remain stagnant without any tangible progress.
The fourth clause stipulates the integration of institutions within the administration of the Syrian state. However, this clause is often handled selectively, as it is reduced to talk about the oil and funds of the North and East Syria region, as if these areas alone possess national resources, while the rest of Syrian geography with all its crossings, ports, airports, and natural resources is ignored.
From here, it becomes clear that this approach overlooks the essence of the agreement, which is not based on transferring control from one party to another, but on building an integrated participatory path. Integration according to the text and spirit of the agreement is neither a unilateral process nor a concession from one party to another. Rather, it is supposed to be a balanced national partnership that includes all parties on an equal footing within a unifying national framework.
Within this framework, it can be observed that the logic of the transitional authority in its approach to North and East Syria does not differ greatly from that of the former Syrian regime. Both view the region as a space that must be reclaimed as a political and economic spoil, rather than as part of a homeland with its own social particularities. This is a logic that deals with the region from the angle of control and access to resources regardless of the cost.
This logic does not stem from concepts of partnership and citizenship, but from a narrow security and economic vision that ignores the reality of the region, its social composition, and the rights of its inhabitants. It also ignores the need for genuine justice in the distribution of wealth and power, which are essential elements of any stable and sustainable state project.
In light of this reality, a fundamental question emerges that is ignored in the prevailing discourse. How can there be talk of genuine integration in the absence of any real progress on the political and constitutional clauses. How can the majority of Syrians be convinced of the seriousness of partnership while political and economic decision making remains monopolized by a single entity, without real representative institutions or mechanisms of oversight and accountability.
Just as questions are raised about oil revenues in the areas of the Autonomous Administration, it is also legitimate to raise questions about the funds of the transitional authority, its sources of income, and the revenues of land and sea crossings, ports, and airports. It is also legitimate to question which body holds the authority to manage these resources, how they are administered, where they are spent, and under what oversight standards.
National resources are not limited to oil alone. They include gas, phosphates, border crossings, airports, and ports, all of which are public property belonging to all Syrians. This requires that they be managed within a transparent national vision based on clear budgets and declared political and economic agreements, far removed from the logic of dominance and appropriation.
True integration means partnership in managing these resources rather than monopolizing them. It means sharing responsibilities as well as rights. It means building institutions capable of protecting public funds and preventing their use as tools of political influence or for reproducing domination in new forms.
No integration process can succeed if it is built on a logic of appropriation or treated as a favor granted by one party alone. Nor can a stable state be built if the concept of the state is reused as a cover to impose a fait accompli instead of serving as a unifying framework for all its citizens.
The continued treatment of the resources of North and East Syria as a political spoil will only deepen divisions and undermine any serious national path. The only viable option remains a genuine partnership based on transparency, accountability, and respect for the text and spirit of the 10 March agreement in all its clauses.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of +963
