The fall of Baghouz in 2019 marked the end of ISIS’s territorial control, but not the end of the organisation itself. Rather than collapsing, ISIS entered a new phase of strategic adaptation, reshaping its structure to survive in an environment defined by insecurity, political fragmentation, and prolonged conflict.
Today, ISIS no longer governs territory, but it remains an active security actor. Estimates indicate that thousands of fighters are still operating in Syria and Iraq, alongside several thousand detainees held in prisons and camps in north-east Syria. These conditions continue to present a serious risk, particularly if instability enables escapes or renewed organisation.
In Syria, ISIS activity is concentrated in areas suffering from security gaps and weak governance. The group relies on small, mobile cells that carry out limited but disruptive attacks – including roadside bombs and ambushes targeting security forces and rival armed groups. These operations aim less at territorial control and more at maintaining presence, exhausting opponents, and reinforcing the image of survival.
Recent incidents underline this threat. In December, an attack near Palmyra resulted in the killing of American and Syrian personnel, highlighting ISIS’s ability to strike despite sustained military pressure.
Internationally, ISIS continues to project influence beyond the Middle East. Through online propaganda and ideological messaging, it inspires attacks carried out by individuals or small groups with no direct organisational link. Violent incidents in countries such as Australia illustrate that ISIS’s ideological reach persists, even as its conventional military capabilities decline.
These developments confirm that ISIS has shifted from a territorial organisation to a networked threat – one that feeds on political disorder, economic hardship, and unresolved conflict. Assessing the group’s danger therefore requires more than counting fighters. It demands an understanding of how ideology, networks, and regional dynamics interact to sustain its presence well beyond 2025.
Central command behind decentralised action
Hassan Abu Hanieh, an expert on Islamist movements at the Politics and Society Institute in Jordan, told +963 that ISIS’s leadership is believed to be primarily based in Syria, overseeing the group’s external branches in Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere.
According to Abu Hanieh, the loss of Baghouz forced ISIS to adapt quickly. While the organisation adopted a decentralised operational model, this did not mean the disappearance of central authority. Strategic decisions remain centralised, while execution is left to local cells.
ISIS, he explains, has shifted from conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics and a war of attrition. Cells enjoy limited autonomy in carrying out attacks, but they do not independently determine targets or strategy. This continued centralisation is evident in the group’s media output, particularly its weekly publication Al-Naba, which issues guidance to fighters across different regions.
Abu Hanieh also points to the growing risk posed by so-called lone actors. These individuals are not formally part of ISIS’s structure but are influenced by its ideology or driven by frustration with economic and political conditions. He suggests that the December attack near Palmyra may fall into this category.
Syria’s worsening economic situation, the absence of reconstruction, foreign military interventions, and competing regional agendas all contribute to an environment in which extremist ideas can spread. Abu Hanieh estimates that ISIS maintains between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters in Syria, in addition to sleeper cells in urban areas.
Crucially, he argues that ISIS does not need to rebuild. Its leadership, funding channels, ideological framework, and external networks remain in place. The group’s strength, he concludes, is structural rather than inherent – shaped by Syria’s unresolved political, social, and economic crises.
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Coordination, fragmentation, and limits of power
Talaat Taha, a Cairo-based political analyst, told +963 that ISIS cells in Syria may be coordinating with affiliated groups in Iraq. He notes that while Western states such as the United Kingdom have criminalised these organisations and imposed sanctions, the group continues to operate in spaces where state authority is weak.
Taha raises questions about how ISIS continues to access weapons and funding, suggesting that its persistence has, at times, coincided with attempts by the United States to reduce its regional presence. Similar patterns, he argues, have appeared previously in both Iraq and Syria.
Despite this, Taha stresses that ISIS today is weaker than at its peak. Its recruitment capacity has declined, its movement is more restricted, and its territorial ambitions are limited. However, he cautions against viewing the group as either fully weakened or fully resurgent. Its impact depends less on numbers and more on access to resources, weapons, and permissive environments.
ISIS, he concludes, is currently focused on consolidation rather than expansion – maintaining relevance and survival while waiting for shifts in the regional balance that could once again open space for growth.
