Amid escalating Israeli rhetoric about new security arrangements along Lebanon’s southern border, political, military, and legal tracks are converging on a single question: the future of the area south of the Litani River. The debate centres on whether Lebanon is moving toward consolidating a calm based on international resolutions, or whether new on-the-ground realities may be imposed under security and economic pretexts. As Lebanese officials point to progress in efforts to confine weapons to state authority, warnings of potential escalation continue to shape assessments across security, political, and legal spheres.
Security Reality South of the Litani and the Question of “Vacuum”
Addressing the security landscape, retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb, a security affairs researcher, told +963 that “the Lebanese Army is defensive by nature and was never historically built as an offensive force. Its capabilities are designed to defend territory, and there is a clear political decision from the presidency to confront any Israeli incursion regardless of available means.”
He added that “talk of a security vacuum is not linked to the deployment of the Lebanese Army. The army has never been the cause of such a vacuum. Rather, the vacuum resulted from the decline in Hezbollah’s capabilities, particularly after the announcement of the discovery of dozens of tunnels and the seizure of large quantities of weapons and ammunition. This has effectively altered the balance of field control.”
In the same context, Hussein Al-Deek, professor of international relations and an expert on Israeli affairs, said in remarks to +963 that “Israel’s northern front remains open, especially with Israeli settlers still unable to return to their homes, particularly in Kiryat Shmona.” He argued that this reality keeps escalation scenarios on the table, noting that “Israeli public opinion has been prepared for a potential military confrontation with Lebanon and Iran.”
From a legal perspective, Dr. Mohammad Hossam Hafez, an academic, lawyer, and former diplomat, stressed that “UN Security Council resolutions clearly stipulate respect for Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and limit security arrangements south of the Litani River to the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL.”
He told +963 that “any security, administrative, or military presence outside this framework constitutes a direct violation of international resolutions.”
Israeli Arrangements and the Prospect of a Buffer Zone
Regarding Israeli proposals related to security zones, Malaeb said that “the region is entering a phase of implementing an Israeli military strategy based on defence beyond its borders since 2006, supported by the US national security strategy, which places Israel’s security at the top of its priorities.”
He added that “this approach is reflected in the establishment of security zones, as seen in Syria, eastern Gaza, and the West Bank, and it could extend to southern Lebanon.”
Malaeb warned that “proposals involving forces not affiliated with the United Nations operating in southern Lebanon, coordinating with the Lebanese Army and under external leadership with Israeli approval, represent a dangerous development.”
For his part, Al-Deek said that “Netanyahu may present Trump with a proposal to resume military operations in southern Lebanon, including large-scale strikes that could result in civilian casualties.” He noted that such operations could “aim to establish a wide security belt in southern Lebanon, functioning as a closed military zone separating Lebanon from Israel.”
He added that “Israel may seek to impose a long-term security model in southern Lebanon similar to what is happening in Gaza,” pointing out that “Israel currently controls between 54 and 60 percent of the Gaza Strip.”
In contrast, Hafez emphasised that “any proposal to establish a buffer zone or a special economic zone in southern Lebanon is entirely inconsistent with UN Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 1701, and constitutes a blatant violation of Lebanese sovereignty.”
He added that “the Security Council has never granted Israel the authority to impose security, military, or administrative realities inside Lebanese territory,” stressing that “any buffer zone, security enclave, or economic protectorate, regardless of how it is labelled, is a coercive measure imposed by an occupying power.”
The US Role and the Possibility of a “Green Light”
On the American dimension, Malaeb said that “statements by the US envoy acknowledging Israel’s inability to eliminate Hezbollah’s weapons effectively constitute a green light for Lebanese authorities to continue their plan without clashing with the group.”
He explained that “the Lebanese government is not moving toward disarmament by force, but rather pursuing a gradual strategy of weapons containment, ultimately leading to state control.”
By contrast, Al-Deek argued that “the anticipated meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could involve a broad regional trade-off, based on de-escalation in Gaza and Syria in exchange for escalation or military action in Lebanon and Iran.”
He added that “Trump is expected to present major demands during the meeting,” which could be met by “granting Netanyahu a green light to act militarily on the Lebanese and Iranian fronts.”
Al-Deek stressed that “US policy in the region primarily prioritises Israeli and American interests,” noting that “Lebanon does not constitute a central priority in US strategic calculations.”
Hafez, however, underscored that “any American green light for Israeli military action has no legal value under international law.” He explained that “the unilateral will of any state, including the United States, cannot replace the rules of international law,” and that “the concept of pre-emptive strikes is legally rejected.”
Civilians, Sovereignty, and Legal Consequences
Regarding the impact of potential security arrangements on civilians, Malaeb said that “Hezbollah’s primary demand is a simultaneous Israeli withdrawal in exchange for gradual steps on the weapons file,” highlighting the sensitivity of any measures affecting the southern field reality.
He also noted that “the postponement of the donor conference for the Lebanese Army from early January to February reflects donor states’ anticipation of tangible outcomes, particularly concerning the army’s role in weapons control.” He stressed that “Lebanon faces clear commitments that must be implemented in the coming phase.”
Al-Deek, meanwhile, said that “statements by Hezbollah’s leadership, especially its rejection of handing over or relinquishing weapons, could accelerate an Israeli military operation after the holiday period.” He argued that “regional, international, and domestic conditions are increasingly conducive to a potential Israeli–Hezbollah confrontation.”
Hafez concluded by stressing that “there is no legal basis under international law allowing Israel to prevent civilians from returning to their areas or to restrict their movement.” He explained that “the Green Line does not constitute an internationally recognised border, but rather a unilateral measure linked solely to Israeli will.”
He concluded by affirming that “preventing civilians from returning or imposing broad movement restrictions constitutes a grave violation of international law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law,” noting that such practices “may amount to collective punishment or forced displacement, both prohibited under the Geneva Conventions.,” adding that “any Israeli military escalation against Lebanon would fall outside the framework of international law.”
