Amid increasing US movement on the Syrian file, the visit of the US envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, to Israel has come to shed light on a complex path of security understandings and reciprocal political pressures, against a backdrop of clear divergence in how these moves and their limits are interpreted.
According to reports by Israeli media, Barrack seeks during his visit to discuss the establishment of “red lines” related to Syria, at a time when US assessments indicate that the inerim Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is viewed in Washington as “an ally seeking to stabilize the Syrian state and move it forward,” alongside US concerns that the frequency of Israeli operations could undermine his rule. However, this approach, according to researcher and political analyst Hassan Olayan, collides with a different reality on the ground.
Red Lines
Olayan tells +963 that “Syria is facing impossible Israeli conditions,” explaining that “the Syrian administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa has full knowledge of Israeli demands, yet these demands are based on extensive Syrian concessions without any real Israeli counterpart.”
He adds that “the discussion is partially limited to withdrawal from the south, without addressing core issues such as Mount Hermon or the Golan,” considering this “a negative point in the current course of engagement.”
In contrast to US praise for al-Sharaa, Olayan sees a stark contradiction in Israeli behavior. He says that “US praise for al-Sharaa, particularly by US President Donald Trump, contradicts Israeli policies that continue to violate Syrian geography,” noting that “Israel seeks to exploit the demographic reality in coastal areas, Suwayda, among minorities and Kurds, without guaranteeing Syria’s security or sovereignty.”
In this context, the Turkish role emerges as a potential balancing factor. Olayan points out that “Turkey’s alignment with Syria,” based on the special relationship between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Trump, “could contribute to imposing new realities that improve Syrian conditions and limit Israeli pressure.”
He directly links this to Barrack’s visit, considering that “Tom Barrack’s visit to Israel and his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu come in the context of giving momentum to a de-escalation track amid Israel’s internal challenges and Syria related files.”
Security Understandings
This perspective partially aligns with the reading of Mahmoud Hussein, Vice President of the International Union of Universities for Media Affairs, who believes that “Tom Barrack’s visit to Israel and his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can contribute to enhancing balance between Turkey and Israel on the Syrian file, by opening a direct communication channel that allows Tel Aviv a more effective role in Syrian affairs without undermining Turkish interests.”
Hussein adds to +963 that “Barrack’s statements about cooperation with the region reflect a US tendency to integrate Turkey into the path of regional understandings,” considering that this “could ease previous competition and open space for joint opportunities to support stability, especially in southern Syria.”
According to Hussein, the visit is not limited to its political dimension but also carries direct security implications. He says that “the visit may pave the way for redrawing lines of influence in southern Syria, through exchanging views on ceasefire arrangements and easing tensions,” suggesting that it is “likely to become a starting point for redefining security zones in a way that reduces friction between local factions and external interventions.”
He adds that “talk of quiet talks with Israel indicates the existence of space for joint crisis management that lowers the likelihood of regional confrontation.”
Conversely, former Syrian diplomat Bashar al-Haj Ali offers a more cautious approach, emphasizing that “Tom Barrack’s visit does not open a security negotiation channel between Damascus and Tel Aviv in the traditional sense, but rather establishes a low ceiling security communication track,” explaining that “Washington is acting more as a trusted mailbox than as a political mediator.”
Al-Haj Ali explains to +963 the nature of this track by saying that “what is being circulated is limited to technical understandings related to rules of engagement, lines of separation, and preventing uncalculated friction in southern Syria,” stressing that it “does not include any mutual recognition, peace negotiations, or even a parallel political track.”
He adds that “the maximum that can be achieved at this stage is risk management rather than resolution, an achievement that is temporary by its fragile nature.”
Regarding the background of the US move, al-Haj Ali says the visit “falls within a dual approach led by Washington, based first on managing the conflict and then on recalibrating Israeli behavior within realistic margins, without seeking to strategically constrain Israel.”
He adds that “the US objective is to prevent Tel Aviv from going too far in steps that could embarrass the United States or threaten the stability of the post Assad phase, particularly given the fragility of southern Syria and the entanglement of local actors.”
In contrast, Olayan believes that Washington possesses direct pressure tools. He says that “recent US moves, including the temporary suspension of the Caesar Act bill, give Washington leverage over Netanyahu to prevent escalation and the use of the Syrian file for his domestic agenda.”
He adds that “Damascus’s rejection of demands such as establishing a humanitarian corridor from occupied territories toward Suwayda reflects its adherence to Syria’s territorial unity,” considering that this “aligns with regional positions held by Turkey and Saudi Arabia.”
Limited Gains
On potential gains for Damascus, al-Haj Ali says that “Washington’s success in imposing temporary security understandings with Israel could grant Damascus tactical diplomatic gains,” explaining that the most prominent of these is “the shift from being a marginal file to a necessary partner.”
He adds that “any security understanding, even if temporary, provides practical recognition of the government’s ability to control the ground, reduces military pressure in the south, and opens an undeclared communication window with the West that can later be leveraged in sanctions and reconstruction files.”
In the same context, Hussein links security understandings to the economic situation, saying that “the success of any US sponsored security understandings between Syria and Israel would enhance Syria’s position in the regional equation,” and that this occurs “by granting the Syrian government international recognition and an opportunity to revive the economy.”
He adds that “the partial lifting of sanctions, recently announced, could open the door to investment and reconstruction, thereby strengthening Syria’s standing as a strategic partner in the region after the fall of the previous regime.”
However, al-Haj Ali concludes with a clear warning, stating that “these gains remain limited and non strategic, and are tied to Damascus’s ability to turn security understandings into political capital,” warning that “the visit may be consumed as previous initiatives were if it is confined to silent security commitments without real political investment.”
In summing up the scene, the statements of the speakers converge in describing Barrack’s visit as “a US step aimed at de escalation and risk management, while simultaneously revealing the extent of divergence between Syrian bets, Israeli calculations, and the US ceiling, which so far does not go beyond controlling the conflict rather than resolving it.”
