After the fall of the previous Syrian regime, public debate has revealed a sharp divide between two broad groups. One links political legitimacy to institutional continuity and to what remains of old administrative and economic privileges – a view often associated with the memory of “Assad’s Syria”. The other sees legitimacy in transitioning toward a state based on transitional justice and civilian rule – a vision summed up in the idea of “Sharaa’s Syria”, referring to calls for a lawful, civilian-led political transition.
This divide is more than a political slogan. It reflects two deep reservoirs of experience: one shaped by fear and the threat of retribution among those tied to the old system, and another shaped by memories of repression and demands for long-overdue justice among those who opposed the former regime. This tension places the interim government under immense pressure – testing its ability to mediate, to build public trust and to avoid favouring one audience over the other. It is a tension unfolding amid violent incidents and documented rights violations, which have intensified public anxiety.
Between Two Publics
For those aligned with “Assad’s Syria”, the main concerns are economic and social. They fear losing livelihoods, social standing and access to institutions. They worry that transitional justice could turn into political revenge or that rapid change could upset fragile social balances.
Supporters of “Sharaa’s Syria”, meanwhile, fear the recycling of old elites or the takeover of state institutions by former armed actors without accountability. They worry that promised reforms or justice processes may become symbolic rather than real. Both groups seek stability – yet in very different ways – and both demand clear economic and legal pathways that guarantee citizens’ rights. This makes a transparent and balanced transitional roadmap essential.
Security challenges add to these internal pressures. Explosions, clashes and localised massacres have deepened mistrust between communities and exposed the limits of unified security structures. These events highlight the need for security policies grounded in civilian oversight and clear legal rules – policies that prevent abuses rather than widen them. At the same time, former armed groups attempting to entrench their influence raise questions about the government’s capacity to establish a legitimate monopoly on force.
Civil society actors have proposed roadmaps for transitional justice and reconstruction, but many of these efforts clash with declining political space or the government’s lack of will to act on them. If the transitional period creates genuine room for an agreed-upon process, fears on both sides can be reduced. Without such a plan, however, the risks of reproducing authoritarian habits or sparking new social conflicts remain high.
Assessing the interim government therefore requires recognising this dual public landscape. Restoring security must be balanced with the implementation of transitional justice, reactivating institutions must respect civil liberties, and building trust must speak simultaneously to a constituency afraid of exclusion and another demanding accountability.
A Promising Start, However!
Jalal Al-Hamad, Director of Justice for Life and now based in France, explains: “We cannot issue a final judgement on the interim government. A year, or less, is simply not long enough for a country emerging from conflict – a country whose infrastructure, social fabric, economy and security have all been deeply damaged.”
He adds: “Still, current indicators suggest that the government represents the interests of the new ruling system and figures from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham who have taken control. This does not inspire confidence. These views are not definitive, but they point towards a worrying direction.”
Al-Hamad argues that several decisions were rushed, including the dissolution of state institutions such as the army and security services without distinguishing between those guilty of abuses and those who were not. This, he says, has produced a more fragile and confrontational security environment.
He notes that the government has already missed key opportunities – especially regarding international engagement after massacres in the coastal region and in Suwayda. “Violations were committed by individuals linked to the former regime and by factions in Suwayda, but the government still bears major responsibility. It lost critical opportunities to open a new phase, particularly economically.”
According to Al-Hamad, the government lacks a clear vision: “It promises better security and economic conditions, but such progress requires time, effort and resources. With new appointments and presidential decrees, the outlook is becoming even less clear.”
He acknowledges that today’s environment remains more open than under Assad – there is still a degree of civic space. “But that space is shrinking,” he warns. “Political actors and media tools tied to the government are increasingly used to restrict freedoms. The signs are worrying.”
Hasty Decisions and Fears of Renewed Authoritarianism
Al-Hamad continues: “The tightening of freedoms makes it difficult to say that Syria is safe from a return to authoritarian rule. This could happen sooner than expected if the government continues to rush through restrictive measures.”
He points to widespread fears – from security concerns to economic hardship: “The government lacks a clear vision. Public statements reveal confusion, from unrealistic promises about job creation to diplomatic missteps. It seems more focused on gaining time and consolidating its position than on presenting a medium-term plan.”
He adds that civil society has offered clear proposals on transitional justice, political participation and economic recovery, but the government has shown no political will to adopt them. “One initiative to revive national dialogue was rejected outright. This reinforces fears of sliding back towards authoritarianism. Civil society is trying, but the space is narrowing and officials are not listening.”
A Non-Representative Government with Limited Impact
Omar Jallo, a researcher at the Dialogue Centre for Research based in rural Aleppo, offers another perspective. He says the government’s daily impact on citizens is limited, mostly to price adjustments for housing, electricity and fuel. “Fuel price cuts helped somewhat, but mainly for private car owners,” he notes.
He argues that the government has not yet begun fulfilling its essential social role – guaranteeing services, ensuring affordable basic needs or supporting vulnerable groups through healthcare, education and other public services.
Jallo notes that the government is not representative: “It emerged from an agreement between armed factions to appoint the interim president, who then formed the government. It is not an elected body, nor does it represent the public.”
Still, he acknowledges that the government has succeeded in one major area: preventing a slide into internal war or widespread communal fighting. “That is its most significant achievement so far.”
He stresses that the government operates in extremely difficult conditions, shaped by 14 years of war and economic collapse. It continues to face security gaps in the coastal region, in Suwayda and along the frontlines with the Syrian Democratic Forces, where kidnappings and other abuses take place.
As for sovereignty, Jallou says Syria remains far from achieving it – whether under the current government or future ones. International constraints, sanctions and an empty treasury severely limit state capacity.
He adds that constitutional rights remain distant from practical implementation. Yet political freedoms, he says, are “far better than under Assad”, with citizens able to criticise without direct state repression, though they may face online harassment.
Between Security Control and Political Fragility
Jallo explains that arrests still occur without judicial warrants – not unusual for a state attempting to rebuild itself after an armed transition.
He describes the major differences between the Assad regime and the current system: “Assad’s rule was authoritarian and violent, reducing Syria to a playground for foreign powers. The current system is trying to manage competing interests and use pragmatism to pull Syria out of its crisis.”
Freedom of expression remains one of the clearest differences: criticism is largely tolerated, and authorities either cannot or choose not to impose total control.
Jallo says public fears vary: Assad supporters fear losing privilege or facing retaliation, while opposition supporters fear domination by new power centres. These concerns reflect long-standing ideological divisions and factional conflicts.
He concludes by highlighting the absence of an effective civil society. “Many groups claiming to represent civil society have become part of corrupt networks on both sides of the conflict. Those that remain independent are small, isolated and largely unable to influence policy.”
