The debate over integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a US-backed force and central to the fight against ISIS, controls large areas of north-eastern Syria – into the structure of the Syrian state has returned to the forefront after fresh comments by Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan. Speaking about ongoing negotiations in Damascus, Fidan said Ankara expects an agreement between the SDF and Syria’s transitional government, stressing that Turkey wants “real integration, not a symbolic arrangement”.
Fidan, in an interview with Reuters on the sidelines of the Doha Forum 2025, reiterated that Syria remains a strategic priority for Turkey. He recalled that Ankara adopted an “open-door policy” during the Syrian conflict, hosting millions of refugees for more than a decade, and said Turkey continues to advocate conditions in which all Syrian communities can feel safe and free. He also rejected claims that Turkey is hostile towards Syrian Kurds.
At the same time, Fidan insisted on what he called the “immediate withdrawal” of foreign elements linked to the PKK from Syria. He described this as an essential step for any political or security progress. He also accused Israel of hindering efforts to reunify Syria, describing its policies as “destabilising”.
Turkish Pressures on SDF
Dr Kamal al-Labwani, a Syrian political figure based in Sweden, argues that Fidan’s remarks are “demands accompanied by threats rather than signs of a genuine political shift”. He tells +963 that the SDF is unlikely to voluntarily integrate into a new Syrian state, describing it as a force with a “separatist nationalist project”, supported by international powers that, in his view, want to keep eastern Syria as leverage against Turkey.
Zara Saleh, a UK-based researcher in peace and conflict studies, tells +963 that Fidan’s comments form part of a broader Turkish pressure campaign on the SDF. She explains that Turkey’s significant influence over the interim government in Damascus allows it to push for an integration model aligned with Ankara’s interests. In her view, Turkey’s preferred outcome is the dismantling of the SDF and the redistribution of its fighters into loosely organised factions rather than a unified national army. However, she notes, the SDF is a structured, trained force and a recognised partner of the US-led coalition of nearly 90 states that fought ISIS – making such an outcome unrealistic.
Al-Labwani adds that the agreement reached in March – which he says the United States encouraged both the SDF and interim president Ahmad Al-Sharaa to sign – “was born dead”. He argues that all sides are now distancing themselves from the deal, from hard-line Syrian nationalists to Turkish ultra-nationalists and Islamist factions, who all benefit from continued tension without a full-scale war.
Saleh believes any serious integration would likely be US-backed and would involve incorporating the SDF into specialised security structures while keeping it unified. Under such a model, she says, the SDF would continue leading counter-terrorism operations – an area where Washington considers it a reliable partner – while other factions would take on more limited advisory roles.
She concludes that Turkey’s concerns about the SDF are not purely security-driven but stem from what she describes as a “historic existential fear of Kurdish political gains”. Any Kurdish advancement in Syria, she argues, is viewed in Ankara as a potential internal threat, shaping Turkey’s attempts to limit Kurdish influence by pressuring both Damascus and the SDF.
Al-Labwani predicts a prolonged period of “stalemate and time-buying”, with all actors benefiting from a situation that is neither war nor peace. He argues that the SDF uses the current dynamic to strengthen its autonomy, while Turkey uses it to justify its military presence in Syria and to intensify pressure on Kurdish political movements at home. He also claims that the interim government in Damascus “does not want real partnership” and prefers a model of “social uniformity”.
He concludes that the coming months will bring “loud rhetoric without real change on the ground”, since no actor is ready for a full confrontation or a genuine settlement – a situation he argues benefits Israel, which he claims has long used the Kurdish issue to advance its regional interests.
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AANES: Call for Credible and Lasting Peace
Alongside the Turkish statements, Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Autonomous Administration’s External Relations Department in north-east Syria, reaffirmed the Administration’s willingness to enter direct talks with Turkey. Speaking via video at the International Conference for Peace and Democratic Society in Istanbul, she said the Administration rejects war and violence and supports peace, democracy and inclusive governance.
Ahmed described the conference as “a fundamental and noble step” and said peace-related discussions are gaining seriousness inside Turkey. She also highlighted the influence of Abdullah Öcalan – the imprisoned PKK leader – despite the isolation imposed on him by Turkish authorities.
She expressed her wish to attend the conference in person but said current restrictions prevent her from doing so. She called for removing these obstacles to allow a “credible and lasting” peace process that would stabilise both Syria and Turkey.
Ahmed stressed that any new Syrian state must be based on the rule of law and justice, guaranteeing democracy, freedom of belief and the rights of all communities. She argued that stability in Syria would naturally produce positive effects in Turkey and across the region.
Dual-Track Integration Mechanism
In parallel, Öcalan has suggested a dual-track mechanism for integrating the SDF into the Syrian army. His proposal envisions dividing the force into two parts – one merging with the central army, and the other taking responsibility for local security in the north-east.
The proposal was relayed by Gulistan Kiliç Koçyiğit, a member of the Turkish Democrats Party, following a meeting with Öcalan on 24 November, alongside a parliamentary delegation that included representatives from the AKP, MHP and the Democrats. The remarks were reported by the Turkish outlet T24.
Öcalan stressed the need for a democratic system allowing all Syrian communities to participate according to their identities. He warned that “the SDF will not join any government that reproduces dictatorship”.
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March Agreement: Pragmatic Compromise
Political analyst Amr Hussein tells +963 that Turkish statements – along with Öcalan’s repeated proposals – reopen a sensitive question about Syria’s political future and the nature of any upcoming settlement. He says constitutional integration of the SDF can be interpreted in two contradictory ways: either as a step towards reunifying the military under a central authority, or as a pathway to a legally disguised form of dual governance resembling “security-based autonomy”.
Hussein notes that the March agreement remains a political understanding rather than a binding constitutional framework, lacking guarantees on power-sharing, oversight and the role of armed actors. He describes it as a “pragmatic compromise” that could easily collapse if power balances shift.
He says the broader discussion about decentralisation faces a legal challenge in defining the line between “expanded local administration” and “de facto autonomous governance”. Without clarity, he warns, administrative structures could evolve into a quasi-independent political entity without an official declaration. He argues that any constitutional approach must include clear powers, strict central oversight and a unified security hierarchy.
SDC: March Agreement as a National Pathway
Mamdouh al-Mouslat, co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), warns that any attempt to restore the centralised state that previously marginalised Syrian communities “will not be accepted”. He reaffirms the SDC’s commitment to a democratic, decentralised Syria representing all citizens.
Al-Mouslat says Syria is in a delicate phase of reconstruction and stresses openness to regional and international dialogue that preserves national unity and prevents fragmentation. He argues that the 10 March agreement forms a national pathway towards stability and calls for stronger Syrian–Syrian dialogue as the only real solution.
He highlights the importance of national reconciliation, protection of the rights of all communities and expanding local participation in political decision-making, insisting that meaningful national progress requires a new constitution based on fair representation and genuine political partnership.
