Syria, after the fall of the Assad regime, proceeds along a narrow path reflected in the accelerating pace of profound political transformations reverberating across regional dynamics. In this context, Damascus’s relations with its neighbors appear to surpass geographic markers and exceed the constraints of borders and latitudes. Everyone is anticipating the prospects of cooperation and investment, and the promising opportunities they may carry alongside the risks of security threats and their complex requirements.
This direct overlap between security considerations and economic opportunities reveals the true nature of Syria’s relationship with Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. It is difficult to examine one aspect in isolation from the others despite geographic adjacency and shared borders. This results from the intensity of unresolved files among these countries, especially issues of border regulation, combating illicit activity and confronting cross border extremist groups, as well as attempts to curb their regional threat. This could theoretically pave the way for a full normalization path between Syria and its strategic surroundings. Yet addressing these combined challenges is what may allow the new Syria to find itself within the realm of genuine stability.
Policy Formation
In this regard, political scientist Haitham Saleh tells +963 that “the new Syrian system is still in the phase of formulating its policies toward neighboring states, particularly Lebanon, amid a complex and overlapping landscape governed by multiple unresolved files.”
He adds that Lebanese Syrian relations today are marked by a high degree of intertwinement, beginning with demarcation of land and maritime borders, moving to the suspension of the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination, and extending to the difference in the nature of political ties between the former Syrian regime and the current one vis-à-vis the Lebanese arena. He explains that the features of the new approach have yet to become clear, except through limited visits and general positions that remain non committal.
The Lebanese academic points out that the file of Syrian refugees and displaced people is among the most sensitive and complex issues, as estimates of their numbers in Lebanon vary, while recent data show that many have returned to Syria in recent months. He adds that the file of Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons, connected to security operations or clashes with the Lebanese army, also poses legal and humanitarian challenges requiring careful and deliberate handling.
Saleh notes that relations between Beirut and Damascus are currently passing through a phase of caution and anticipation in their mutual engagement. He points out that Syrian officials have affirmed more than once that they do not wish to interfere in Lebanese internal affairs, and that the previous phase has become part of the past amid new political transformations.
He explains that despite some limited skirmishes along the Lebanese Syrian border, and the impact of several regional factors including Turkish Israeli competition on Syrian territory, the most likely scenario is that the new Syrian system will avoid direct intervention inside Lebanon, even in the event of a broad military confrontation between Lebanon and Israel.
He further notes the possibility that some non compliant factions may take unilateral actions outside the decision of the Syrian state, as occurred during the events in Sweida, given regional entanglements and the intertwining of conflict arenas.
Saleh concludes by saying that the unresolved files between Lebanon and Syria are likely to persist for a considerable period before achieving real settlements, in the absence of clear indicators of a fundamental shift or direct intervention that could alter the trajectory of bilateral relations in the foreseeable future.
Different Forces
Meanwhile, Jordanian academic Amal al-Jabbour tells +963 that Syria is witnessing a new phase in which the nature of its relations with neighboring states Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey is evolving.
Al-Jabbour notes that Syria’s borders are no longer mere lines of longitude and latitude on a map, but have come to reveal patterns of influence benefiting different forces, alongside the presence of multiple jihadist groups active in various border regions.
She points out that Israel exploits this reality to justify its military intervention in southern Syria, as recently occurred in the Beit Jinn area, in addition to stirring threats against certain social components particularly members of the Druze community which in turn carries security implications affecting Syria and its neighbors alike.
Al-Jabbour stresses that current relations between Syria and neighboring states are built on a complex mix of economic opportunities and security concerns. The United States decision to suspend the implementation of the Caesar Act for four years has, in her view, given Damascus a chance to revive its economy and opened the door for renewed trade flows and investment, which is expected to benefit neighboring states that rely in part on shared crossings and commercial exchange.
Yet she affirms that security concerns remain prevalent, given the ongoing activity of extremist groups and the absence of full Syrian state control over borders, prompting neighboring countries to engage with Damascus with noticeable caution. Economic cooperation is countered by heightened anxiety over potential security threats.
Al-Jabbour explains that the future landscape of Syrian relations with its neighbors could follow three principal scenarios. “The most likely scenario is cautious openness, representing a gradual return of trade and the resumption of some joint projects while maintaining strict border security. The second scenario is conditional stability, in which economic cooperation expands in exchange for Damascus committing to effective border control and preventing smuggling and infiltration, a complex task involving several actors. The third scenario is security deterioration, should extremist activity resurge or Israeli provocations against Syria and Lebanon escalate, which could stall economic cooperation and return relations to a state of stagnation.”
She notes that Jordan represents the clearest example of this evolving relationship, having been among the states most harmed by the disorder that dominated southern Syria, whether through drug smuggling or attempts by extremist groups to infiltrate across the border.
She adds that with changes on the ground inside Syria, Jordan now views any opportunity that contributes to restoring stability in southern Syria with increased seriousness. It supports efforts aimed at securing the border, combating smuggling and reducing the risks of extremism, and hopes for the return of commercial activity through land crossings and the resumption of transport, energy and trade projects.
She affirms that Amman today engages with Damascus in a new spirit, as the relationship has shifted from anxiety and anticipation to an approach based on cooperation and the protection of shared interests.
Al-Jabbour concludes that the next phase of relations between Syria and its neighbors will rest on a delicate balance between promising economic opportunities and persistent security risks. If Damascus succeeds in asserting control over its borders and reducing the influence of armed groups, the region may enter a more stable stage that could lead to building new regional relations that are more realistic and pragmatic, serving the interests of all parties.
It appears logical, when examining the future of the new Syria’s relations with its neighbors, to link this prospect to several fundamental factors that pave the way for a transition from the logic of conflict and political dependency to a logic of security pragmatism based on mutual functional interests. The security factor, especially the threat of cross border groups and organized crime stands as the most influential element in shaping the dynamics between Syria and its surroundings in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. These variables do not indicate the formation of definitive strategic alliances, but instead suggest a gradual and conditional tactical cooperation.
Pressure Card
For his part, Turkish researcher Islam Özkan tells +963 that the regional landscape surrounding Syria is witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of relations between Damascus and its neighbors, especially Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, following the end of the previous regime’s influence and the rise of new forces. The primary pressure card in these relations is no longer “commercial” threats or forms of political dependency, but rather the security anxiety driven by the cross border “jihadist” threat, which has become the key force shaping the next phase.
Özkan believes that this shift compels neighboring states to redefine their relations with Syria, moving from competition and containment toward a framework of shared and necessary security interests imposed by regional stability challenges and the domestic security needs of each state.
He adds that relations with Lebanon are the most sensitive and complex due to the weight of past legacies that require substantial efforts to overcome. However, the emerging security challenge imposes a different reality, as the fragility of shared borders makes security cooperation an urgent necessity rather than a political option. The common objective today is to curb infiltration and halt smuggling, especially confronting extremist groups that use certain border pockets as safe havens. It is likely that both sides will move toward an undeclared pragmatic security cooperation aimed primarily at safeguarding internal stability in both countries.
Within this context, Özkan refers to a potential decline in any model of direct Syrian tutelage over Lebanon, in favor of attempts to rebuild normalized relations founded on equality and respect for Lebanese sovereignty. This is supported by Gulf efforts seeking to stabilize Beirut and fill its political and economic vacuums. Nevertheless, the issue of Syrian refugees remains one of the most complex files, requiring coordinated mechanisms to ensure their voluntary and organized return.
The Turkish researcher argues that Jordan is the closest to establishing a stable relationship with the new Syrian leadership, driven by clear security and economic priorities that outweigh political considerations. Amman focuses primarily on tightening border control, preventing extremist infiltration and combating drug smuggling. This growing coordination may evolve into a form of undeclared regional alignment aimed at securing southern Syria, given Jordan’s fears of any jihadist expansion that could directly threaten its national security.
Economically, Jordan seeks to revive its role as a principal commercial gateway for Syria and the region through reopening border crossings and facilitating the movement of goods. Such cooperation forms a fundamental pillar for sustaining both economies. Amman will also be a pivotal partner in any future reconstruction efforts inside Syria.
Özkan dedicates a significant part of his analysis to Turkey, which he describes as the most militarily and security engaged actor in northern Syria. The future of Ankara Damascus relations will depend on meeting Turkey’s core security interests, particularly concerning the Kurdish file. The issue of the safe and organized return of Syrian refugees in Turkey is also a vital Turkish demand and will be used as a primary leverage point in negotiations toward future normalization. The likely trajectory on the Turkish side is a pragmatic and realistic relationship based on shared interests and de-escalation, with efforts to build a security and economic framework that serves the strategic goals of both countries amid shifting challenges.
Özkan concludes that the most probable scenario is slow, pragmatic and conditional security cooperation between Syria and its regional neighbors, driven by each state’s self interest in protecting its internal security against the cross border “jihadist” threat. This will ultimately reshape the map of regional alliances surrounding Syria in the coming phase.
