Amid a string of political and diplomatic developments unfolding since early 2025, the Caesar Act has returned to the forefront of international attention. A series of official statements by American officials has reignited debate over the future of the sanctions and Washington’s evolving posture toward Damascus. A scenario that once sounded speculative has now become a realistic possibility.
The United States has announced a 180-day suspension of Caesar sanctions, opening the door to a potential full repeal. Washington describes the move as an opportunity to re-engage with Syria, encourage investment and reconstruction, and support a political transition – provided Damascus commits to political reform, minority protections, and ensuring civilian safety. The final decision, however, remains shaped by the balance of influence among the State Department, the Treasury, and Congress.
An Entangled American Vision of the Caesar Act
Hazem Al-Ghabra, a former adviser at the U.S. State Department now living in Washington, tells +963 that the driving purpose behind the push to abolish the Caesar Act is to set Syria “on the right path,” meaning economic, political, and social recovery. He warns that lifting the law too quickly may produce the opposite effect, diluting Washington’s message to Syria’s new government regarding what the United States expects from Damascus on issues such as citizen security, regional stability, political transition, minority rights, and distancing itself from Iran or any “rogue” state, alongside establishing political and economic partnerships with the West.
Al-Ghabra notes that American concern is rooted not only in the past record of the actors governing Damascus today but also in serious mistakes made over the past months. Washington fears losing leverage if its remaining tools – foremost among them sanctions – become less effective.
He explains that U.S. expectations revolve around broad “understandings” cantered on domestic peace, regional peace, and international peace. These form the core of what Washington wants from the Syrian government. The current debate inside Washington focuses on monitoring mechanisms, who oversees them, and the respective roles of Congress, the State Department, and the Treasury. These procedural questions, he says, dominate the internal discussion and could slow the implementation of sanctions relief even if the law is formally lifted.
While the steps required from Damascus are generally clear, Al-Ghabra identifies the most sensitive issue as Israel. He describes Israel as highly influential in Washington and argues that the long-anticipated security agreement has been delayed. Damascus could take steps to reassure Israel, he says, the most important being official recognition of the state of Israel, since no binding agreement can be reached with a state that remains unrecognized.
Regarding minority protections, he notes that conditions have improved, though no final or mutually accepted solutions have been reached. Counterterrorism cooperation, by contrast, has been the most successful front, with effective joint U.S.–Syrian efforts. He cites two remaining core challenges: minorities and Israel – both particularly sensitive within Congress and across the American decision-making system.
Al-Ghabra emphasizes that detailed, scenario-specific agreements are impossible, so both sides rely on broad principles such as domestic, regional, and international peace, and comprehensive counterterrorism. He argues that U.S. demands from the early days following the fall of the former regime still shape Washington’s expectations and reflect not only American priorities but also the aspirations of a large segment of Syrians seeking a better future.
These expectations, he stresses, are not aimed against Syria as a state or society. Protecting minorities, for example, cannot mean prioritizing one group over another. They outline broad principles designed to safeguard all communities and guarantee peace with all non-hostile neighbours. Israel remains the exception, handled gradually toward a broader future arrangement.
Read more: Is Washington Pressuring Israel into Talks with Syria?
He believes the issue has now moved beyond negotiation, particularly after the U.S. president stated that he could lift sanctions entirely because he retains the power to reimpose them at any time. Remaining objections in Congress, he adds, are primarily technical rather than political. Congress maintains close coordination with the State Department through committees that demand continuous updates, and staff members track developments through media and digital platforms. The State Department remains the primary reporting body, while the CIA and the Treasury play roles of varying intensity – a long-standing feature of American foreign-policy practice.
This multiplicity of actors will not obstruct the lifting of sanctions, Al-Ghabra argues. Institutional coordination is routine, and if necessary, new offices or special envoys can be assigned. For Washington, such adjustments are straightforward. He concludes that the core issue now is trust: the president places greater trust in Syria’s new government than many members of Congress. Damascus can help bridge that gap, but any domestic misstep – especially regarding minority rights – could reverse progress.
Standards and Decision-Making Problem
Bashar Ali Al-Haj Ali, a Syrian diplomat and politician speaking to +963, notes that although the Caesar Act’s conditions appear technical, they are in fact broad political criteria that give Washington wide interpretive authority. The Act links sanctions relief to political conduct, civilian safety, human-rights standards, and an American-framed political process.
He stresses that these are not measurable benchmarks but flexible frameworks that allow Washington to keep Caesar as an open-ended pressure tool against Syria – and against any country considering economic or financial engagement with it. Even if Damascus meets certain expectations, he argues, the decisive factor remains the internal American equation between Congress and the administration. The law’s “verification” mechanisms consist of political reviews prepared by the State Department and submitted to Congress, not independent or international assessments. The entire process remains within U.S. institutions and is applied according to American interests rather than objective standards.
Al-Haj Ali adds that Washington is unlikely to issue a written, precise list of required steps. The United States historically keeps its conditions broad to avoid being obligated to acknowledge that Damascus has met them. This flexibility allows Washington to manage the file according to political timing rather than adherence to specific criteria.
He notes that Washington does not require full implementation of those conditions to begin negotiations or grant limited exemptions. Certain steps may be interpreted as “positive signals,” though they rarely justify full removal. A complete repeal is a major political decision inside Washington, not a direct response to Syrian actions, even if those actions are significant.
He describes the decision-making structure as complicated. Congress authored the law and holds decisive authority over its repeal. The State Department produces regular political assessments regarding Syrian “change.” The Treasury controls the practical enforcement of sanctions and can halt relief by altering a directive or classification. The Pentagon views sanctions as part of its strategic leverage in eastern Syria. The CIA provides classified evaluations that heavily influence both the White House and Congress.
This constellation of power centres means that the repeal of the Caesar Act can be stalled at any stage within the American system. For this reason, he argues, the Act remains a ready-made pressure tool that Washington uses not only toward Damascus but toward any state or entity considering investment or financial activity in Syria.
