Amid the ongoing and successive crises arising from the conflict that Syria has witnessed over the past fourteen years, the issue of naturalization and the granting of Syrian citizenship to foreigners present in the country emerges as one of the major and constitutionally and legally complex problems. It directly affects the social and demographic fabric and raises questions about the authority and eligibility of any government to grant citizenship during transitional periods in which the state is being rebuilt and restructured, the constitution is being established as the principal framework for legal and institutional order, and the compatibility of such steps with the country’s social reality is being assessed.
A file with new dimensions
The issue of naturalization has been significantly present in Syria since the establishment of the state following the end of the French Mandate. Yet the matter took on broader new dimensions with the outbreak of the revolution and the onset of the military conflict, which saw the intervention of various actors alongside both the ousted regime and the armed opposition. Numerous foreign elements spread across the country, and efforts were made to grant them citizenship under the provisions of Decree No. 276 of 1969, which regulates the mechanisms and conditions for acquiring Syrian nationality. However, specialized studies confirm that the issue now carries multiple political and demographic dimensions affecting the Syrian state as a whole.
Decree No. 276 sets the conditions for those eligible for Syrian citizenship. It applies to individuals born in or outside the country to a Syrian father; those born in the country to a Syrian mother whose paternal lineage is not legally established; those born in the country to parents of unknown nationality; and those who have resided in the country continuously for at least five years prior to submitting their application, who have good conduct and no prior convictions of major crimes or offenses involving moral turpitude, and who possess expertise or skills that can benefit the country or have a lawful means of livelihood and are literate in Arabic. It also applies to those who have rendered distinguished services to the state. Applications are submitted by the Minister of Interior to the President of the Republic.
Concerns about demographic change
Reports affirm that the naturalization of foreigners and granting them new identities, whether in Syria or elsewhere, constitutes a method used by some states and groups to reinforce their demographic and political influence, with potentially long term strategic implications. This follows discussions about the intention of the Syrian transitional government to grant citizenship to foreign fighters who fought alongside opposition factions against the ousted regime. This was confirmed by interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa last February in an interview with The New York Times, where he stated that his government would consider granting citizenship to foreign fighters who have lived in Syria for years, some of whom have married Syrian women.
Foreign fighters
According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the number of foreign fighters who have taken part in the Syrian war since 2011 is estimated between twenty thousand and thirty thousand. Western media reports indicate that more than seven thousand five hundred fighters of non Syrian nationalities fought alongside opposition factions in the northwest, including Uyghurs, Caucasians, Tajiks, Chechens, Turkistanis, and others.
In January, sources within the Syrian interim government revealed that the government had already begun procedures to revoke the citizenship of about seven hundred thousand Iranians, Iraqis, and Lebanese, in addition to thousands of fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan, who obtained citizenship during the rule of the ousted regime through exceptional measures that formed part of policies aimed at altering the demographic composition of certain strategic areas, particularly those near Damascus or along routes of Iranian influence in eastern Syria, and near Shiite shrines such as Sayyida Zainab and others.
National identity
Commenting on the granting of citizenship to foreigners, Samer al-Deyaei, executive director of the Free Lawyers Association and a resident of Homs, tells +963 that the issue of naturalization is one of the most sensitive matters in Syria because it is directly tied to national identity and to a sovereign right governed by law. It cannot be tampered with under wartime conditions. Citizenship is not an administrative formality but a legal and cultural bond that determines who is Syrian. Any alteration outside legal parameters immediately affects the social structure and the stability of the state. He notes that during the years of conflict, granting citizenship to certain incoming fighters or foreigners affiliated with armed groups became one of the most dangerous forms of demographic change, as it occurred outside the conditions set by Decree No. 276, which requires long term residence, good conduct, and integration. The result was the emergence of new population groups not organically linked to their localities, which altered power dynamics in some regions, affected property rights and rights of return, and created pockets of non national loyalties.
Al-Deyaei states that, legally, Syrian nationality is a sovereign right that is not subject to political whims or symbolic rewards. It is governed precisely by the provisions of Decree No. 276, which grants authority for naturalization and revocation solely to the President through the Minister of Interior. This simply means that any other entity, regardless of its name or role during the revolution, does not have the authority to grant citizenship or modify its conditions, as this touches the core of statehood. During the transitional phase, the issue becomes even more complex. An interim government, by nature temporary and constitutionally incomplete, cannot make decisions that alter the population structure or redefine national identity. This principle is well established in political transition models around the world, where transitional authorities are not permitted to enact permanent decisions, particularly those that are irreversible, such as naturalization.
A security and political character
For his part, legal researcher Ayman Abu Hashim, based in Damascus, tells +963 that granting citizenship to foreigners in Syria is a major problem primarily because of its security and political nature. These individuals came to Syrian territory as fighters driven by ideological motives rather than for work or education. He adds that the issue is also tied to how these fighters can be rehabilitated through educational, social, and cultural programs that reintegrate them into society after ensuring they have severed ties with extremist ideas.
He stresses that if the state moves toward granting foreigners citizenship, amendments must be made to Nationality Law No. 276 of 1969, particularly its third chapter, which regulates the cases in which Syrian citizenship may be granted. Under this law, foreign fighters cannot be naturalized. Legally, a distinction must be made between two categories: fighters who joined the Syrian revolution, and groups that existed under the previous regime but did not engage in military activity and remained after its fall. There is no indication that the latter are under consideration for naturalization.
Last February, Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Council Chairman Marat Imankulov stated at a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia that, according to estimates, up to twenty thousand foreign fighters joined Syrian government security forces, including members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, with many such fighters originating from Central Asia and the North Caucasus.
The “Hasakah Foreigners” and the “Unregistered”
While the transitional Syrian government announces its intention to grant citizenship to foreign fighters, the “Hasakah Foreigners” and the “Unregistered” of the Kurdish population in eastern Syria remain stateless since the 1962 census, which stripped tens of thousands of their citizenship on the grounds that they were migrants from a foreign country and required residents to present documents proving they lived in Syria prior to 1945. Human Rights reports estimate that around one hundred twenty thousand people were stripped of citizenship. A legislative decree issued in April 2011 restored citizenship to those recorded in the “foreigner” registry but did not include the “unregistered.”
Al-Deyaei stresses that nationality cannot be treated with a logic of population replacement. Citizenship cannot be revoked from one foreign group and granted to another merely because the balance of power has shifted. This would be a clear contradiction unless based on a single legal standard applied equally to all. The core of the issue is not the nationality of the Iranian, Iraqi, or Afghan per se, but the context in which citizenship was granted during the war and how it was acquired. Most naturalizations under the former regime occurred outside the legal framework requiring long term civil residence, a clean record, and social integration. Instead, they were granted through security channels or under Article Six concerning “distinguished services” in a politicized manner. This provides the transitional state with a legal basis to review and annul those naturalizations under the citizenship revocation provisions of Decree No. 276.
He adds that all foreign fighters, whether those who fought for the ousted regime, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), or any other faction, must be subject to the same rule. Anyone who carried a weapon in an internal conflict, acquired citizenship unlawfully, or settled in displaced areas as an extension of a military force must have their status reviewed individually in accordance with the law. In this way, revoking the citizenship of those naturalized by the regime is not political selectivity, and refraining from naturalizing foreign fighters aligned with the SDF is not discrimination. Rather, it is the consistent application of one principle: the illegitimacy of wartime naturalization and the necessity of protecting national identity and preventing the consolidation of demographic change.
Abu Hashim believes that revoking citizenship from the hundreds of thousands of fighters and families who received it under the former regime is a natural step after its fall, as they obtained citizenship unlawfully for evident political and sectarian reasons. Many were involved in repression and atrocities against the Syrian people, and many joined militias and factions that committed bombardment, destruction, property seizures, and forced displacement. Therefore, stripping them of citizenship is natural because it was not acquired through a legitimate or normal process.
