Months after the reformation of Syria’s security and military institutions, researchers and observers say these bodies still fall short of representing the nation’s diversity. Rather than uniting Syrians under one structure, they have become arenas of competing loyalties and identities – a reflection of weak transitional leadership and fragile state institutions.
While some experts argue that the country has travelled halfway towards rebuilding inclusive national frameworks, the reality on the ground suggests otherwise. The failure to attract all social and political components has left these institutions transitional in character – functioning, yet not fully national.
Narrow Structures and Hasty Rebuilding
Political analyst Mohammad Hwaidi tells +963 that the new authority “has failed to attract Syria’s diverse communities because its structure remains of one colour – confined within a specific ideological and sectarian framework”. This, he says, has prevented it from developing a national discourse that speaks to all Syrians.
The post-war reformation of the security and military bodies, Hwaidi explains, was “hasty and poorly managed”, involving the dismissal of officers and employees who had played no direct role in the conflict. The result was a depletion of human expertise and the exclusion of capable Syrians who might have contributed to rebuilding the institutions.
As the new leadership closed in on a narrow circle of loyalties, other groups withdrew into local identities, losing trust in the state. In this vacuum, sub-national affiliations began to replace the notion of a collective Syrian identity – each group viewing the other as a rival rather than a partner in rebuilding the country.
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A Legacy of Distrust
The rebuilding of Syria’s security and military institutions carries the weight of a long and complicated legacy. For decades, these bodies were designed to protect the regime, not the state – instruments of political and social control rather than pillars of citizenship. As a result, they remain tainted by public mistrust, even after the system’s collapse.
Many Syrians had hoped the fall of the regime would lead to genuinely national institutions. Yet, as analysts point out, much of the new system reproduces old mechanisms, only under different names.
Halfway Towards National Representation
Security analyst Hassan Khalilo offers a more optimistic view. He believes such turbulence is typical in post-revolutionary transitions.
“It is natural,” he tells +963, “for societies emerging from authoritarian rule to experience a temporary phase of insularity while the old order is dismantled – and Syria has gone through that phase relatively quickly.”
Khalilo points to several positive developments: a rise in voluntary enlistment across internal security forces and the army; the creation of the tourism police in coastal cities with participation from Alawite men and women; and the March 10th Agreement, which allows the incorporation of three divisions from the Syrian Democratic Forces into the national army.
“These steps,” he says, “indicate that the institutions are halfway towards a more balanced and representative structure.”
Integration and Control Challenges
Yet optimism remains tempered by the reality of weak control and authority. The integration of armed factions into the formal military structure is still fraught with difficulties. Special committees have been established to manage recruitment and discipline under new standards, but implementation is slow and results limited.
The interim government struggles to extend its authority in areas such as the Druze-majority city of Suwayda, where local armed groups refuse full subordination to central command. This fractured landscape continues to undermine the vision of a single, unified Syrian state.
Expertise Lost, Division Deepened
Field reports suggest that officers who defected from the former regime remain excluded from senior leadership, replaced by new commanders who often lack the necessary military experience.
Analysts warn that this approach – prioritising loyalty over competence – prevents the creation of professional institutions and entrenches division along regional and sectarian lines.
According to Hwaidi, sidelining experienced officers has deprived the institutions of essential balance and expertise. “The lack of diversity within these bodies,” he says, “undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of Syrians and perpetuates mistrust between society and the state.”
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Reform or Regression
Despite the flaws, Khalilo insists this is not a story of total failure. “The security and military institutions have begun a gradual transformation towards more professional structures,” he says. “With time, and if openness to broader participation continues, this evolution can consolidate into genuine reform.”
At present, Syria has managed to rebuild its security and military tools – but not their national legitimacy. Political and sectarian considerations still weigh heavily on decision-making, and trust between the state and its people remains fragile.
The country now stands at a decisive crossroads. It can pursue genuine reform that widens participation and restores the institutions’ national role – or remain locked in the old cycle of exclusion and control.
In essence, Syria’s experience represents a partial success in rebuilding institutions, but a clear failure in representation. The path towards truly national security and military bodies remains long – yet possible, if guided by political will and a shared national vision.
