Syria’s state institutions are navigating a sensitive phase of reconstruction after long years of war that destroyed infrastructure and weakened administrative systems across various sectors.
This process, which was expected to pave the way toward stability and reconstruction, faces a fundamental obstacle: the weak ability to attract national expertise and skilled professionals capable of leading administrative reform and developing public services.
Since the formation of the Syrian Interim Government following the fall of the regime, increasing challenges have emerged regarding the continued collapse of state institutions. These factors have weakened their capacity to effectively implement developmental programs and delayed economic and social recovery efforts.
While the government attempts to restore its institutions to normal operational performance, officials face a recurring dilemma: who will manage the rehabilitation phase and repair the deep institutional damage?
The skilled professionals who once formed the backbone of Syrian administration have left the country, while young talents seek opportunities abroad. Government administrations, meanwhile, suffer from a professional vacuum that slows the momentum of public service delivery.
The crisis of expertise and its absence now threaten the recovery process, not only through weakened public services but also through diminished planning and implementation capabilities. This raises serious questions about the future of state institutions in the absence of professionals with the vision and experience required for rebuilding.
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Bridging the Institutional Gap
Zuheir Adnan al-Jundi, Chairman of the Board of Trustees at Al-Khawabi Foundation for Development and an active civil society figure, believes that civil society organizations can play a central role in bridging Syria’s institutional gap by promoting transparency, capacity-building, and participatory initiatives with governmental and community entities.
In an interview with +963, al-Jundi emphasized that the Syrian Interim Government must recognize the importance of this role and work to strengthen it by expanding participatory decision-making, thereby improving institutional performance and efficiency across Syria.
Discussing the reasons behind the government’s failure to attract national talent, all-Jundi explained that the absence of a coherent approach to human resource management and administrative planning is among the key challenges. He added that exclusion on political or social grounds has created an unattractive environment for skilled professionals, particularly in the post-regime period.
He further noted that administrative sluggishness and bureaucratic inflation remain major obstacles to institutional development, describing the old administrative system as “a failed and bloated structure built on narrow loyalties,” with actual productivity estimated at no more than 40 percent.
Al-Jundi pointed out that weak financial incentives, the absence of a fair rewards system, the concentration of decision-making power, and lack of transparency in appointments have all driven professionals away from public service and degraded overall institutional performance.
He proposed launching joint training programs between universities and international organizations to qualify youth and local professionals in public administration, planning, and governance. He also called for the establishment of transparent employment platforms to allow government institutions access to an updated database of national experts, ensuring equal opportunities.
To enhance the work environment and make it more attractive for national expertise, al-Jundi stressed the importance of adopting clear policies for accountability, evaluation, and promotion within public institutions. He noted that “return of expertise” initiatives targeting Syrians abroad could play a crucial role in resettling skilled professionals and supporting the administrative reform process.
He warned against the persistence of administrative centralization and the lack of local participation in economic and developmental decision-making, emphasizing that empowering local communities is a prerequisite for the success of any genuine institutional reform in Syria.
Since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, the state has never been the same. What began as a popular movement calling for freedom and justice quickly evolved into a multi-faceted armed conflict. Over the years, state institutions have disintegrated, and the country’s economic and social foundations have collapsed, turning Syria into a textbook example of a “failed state.”
Years of war have led to the gradual erosion of Syrian state institutions, particularly in the sectors of security, administration, and services. The central government has lost control over entire provinces such as Idlib, parts of Daraa, northern and eastern Syria, and areas in the north under Turkish influence. With widespread displacement and destruction, the state’s ability to perform its essential functions, from maintaining security and providing healthcare and education to delivering basic services like water and electricity, has severely diminished.
Political and Regional Challenges
Dr. Mokhtar Ghobashi, Secretary-General of the al-Farabi Center for Political Studies, argues that one of the key reasons behind the Syrian Interim Government’s failure to attract expertise lies in its political nature. The government is under close scrutiny from both internal and external powers due to its association with a specific political faction, raising doubts about its ability to embrace and coexist with other Syrian constituencies.
In his interview with +963, Ghobashi stated that the real challenge for the government lies in building balanced relations with various political and social forces. The narrow political space currently available has created a sense of hesitation in dealing with it.
Ghobashi identified three pivotal issues whose resolution would grant the government legitimacy and continuity: the situation in Sweida, the coastal region, and northern and eastern Syria. Reaching genuine agreements on these matters, particularly the unification of military and administrative forces under a national framework, would be a decisive factor in ensuring the country’s stability.
He added that the need for qualified personnel represents a major challenge at this stage, as state management requires wisdom and professional expertise amid complex political circumstances. Addressing displacement and refugee issues remains a national priority, as no institutional reform can occur without first reordering the “Syrian house” and solidifying social and economic stability.
Ghobashi stressed that achieving political and economic stability is essential for the return of national expertise. A work environment cannot become attractive without clear political, security, and economic guarantees. He added that the rehabilitation of government institutions should follow the resolution of larger issues related to state legitimacy and unity.
Accordingly, rebuilding state institutions cannot be achieved merely by restoring buildings or issuing laws. It requires rebuilding the minds that lead them. The administrative future of Syria depends on the government’s ability to create an environment that attracts expertise, adopt transparent standards for recruitment and promotion, and link performance to competence rather than loyalty. Without turning reform rhetoric into tangible mechanisms, Syrian state institutions will remain trapped in a cycle of weakness and stagnation, regardless of changing slogans or plans.
