Over recent decades, the Middle East has witnessed the dramatic rise of political Islam. From Turkey and Iran to Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, Islamist movements have taken many forms – some collapsing entirely, others adapting to survive. A few have managed to reconcile their religious agendas with the structures of modern states, developing civilian political systems and evolving gradually within democratic frameworks.
The most challenging case today, however, is Syria. Unlike the parliamentary or electoral roots of movements in North Africa and Turkey, Syria’s new reality has emerged from a militant, jihadist background built around an ideology that rejects the very idea of the nation-state. This ideology, shaped by dreams of a global caliphate, has openly called for fighting “polytheists, Jews, Christians, apostates and heretics” until they submit to a rigid vision of faith.
Yet, despite this militant origin, the political discourse now coming from Syria’s leadership has taken a surprisingly different turn. The rhetoric of victory has been purged of its jihadist references and reshaped into a neutral, almost liberal language, appealing to international norms. The transformation shocked both supporters and critics alike, especially those who once pledged allegiance to jihad and divine sovereignty. These factions, long committed to an anti-nationalist agenda, suddenly found themselves in a new state system bound by international law and human rights commitments, under scrutiny from the global community.
Beyond the military scene, Syria now faces a deeper legislative and ideological clash between two irreconcilable visions of governance. For the jihadist current, the question of legitimacy is simple: law must come either from God or from the “tyrant – there is no third path. They refer to a rigid tradition of jurisprudence rooted in Hanbali doctrine and Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings, later revived by the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century, which led to violent conflicts across Arabia and the Levant.
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Will Syria repeat this pattern? The answer remains uncertain. Recent developments on the coast and in Suwayda have revealed that sectarian and takfiri rhetoric still persists within parts of the armed forces. Even official inquiries have acknowledged sectarian crimes committed by hundreds of state-affiliated individuals, with trials reportedly underway. Such incidents underline the fragile balance between the state’s commitment to civil governance and the lingering influence of extremist thinking.
Nevertheless, this is not an unchangeable destiny. History shows that revolutions often begin with anger and militancy but gradually shift towards moderation as societies stabilise. Civil life demands compromise. In time, even the most militant movements undergo profound internal revisions, replacing the language of vengeance with that of coexistence and citizenship.
Syria’s long history as a mosaic of cultures and religions offers hope. Despite centuries of upheaval and waves of religious extremism, it has remained a place where faiths coexist. Its social fabric, rooted in diversity and tolerance, makes the idea of a purely theocratic or exclusionary state incompatible with its historical identity.
Several forces are now pushing Syria toward a more civil order. Politically, there is a genuine desire to stabilise and rebuild, something impossible under the dark logic of takfir. Internationally, the country faces mounting pressure on human rights and governance, with close global monitoring of its commitments.
Perhaps most importantly, within Islamic thought itself there exists a deep humanitarian current – who emphasise mercy, justice, and the welfare of people as the essence of religion. Though currently overshadowed by more militant voices, this school of thought has powerful intellectual roots. The humanistic approach within Islamic jurisprudence was embodied by Imam Abu Hanifa, who developed the principle of ‘istihsan’ –preferring what serves the common good over strict analogy. Later jurists expanded on these ideas with concepts like ‘maslaha’ (public interest), ‘urf’ (custom), and ‘istishab’ (continuity), forming the intellectual basis for modern, civil lawmaking in many Muslim-majority countries.
