In recent weeks, numerous reports, statements, and news items have emerged carrying significant details about meetings and direct communication between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and senior Turkish officials. This development has opened the door widely to the possibility of tangible and even “surprising” changes in the relationship between the SDF and Turkey, a relationship that for years has been marked by escalating tensions.
In May, the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, General Mazloum Abdi, confirmed the existence of direct contacts with Turkey, adding, “We are open to improving relations, including holding a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.”
In an interview with Shams TV, he explained that the SDF maintains both direct communication and mediated channels with Turkey, expressing at the same time his hope that these relations would develop in the near future.
For her part, the co-chair of the Turkish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, Tülay Hatimoğulları, said in June that she believed visits by Turkish officials to northern and eastern Syria, as well as visits by officials of the Autonomous Administration to Ankara, would significantly contribute to advancing the peace process within Turkey in a more effective manner.
Read also: SDF and Turkey: Convergence of Interests or Tactical Necessity?
In an exclusive interview with +963, international relations expert Tarek Ziad Wahbi, based in France, responded to several questions regarding the implications and consequences of raising the level of communication between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey at this particular time. One of the main points discussed was whether this direct communication is a continuation of negotiations with the Syrian government or rather the result of their failure.
Below is the full interview:
Where is the relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey heading after talk of direct communication between the two sides?
The current relations between the SDF and Turkey are an important achievement for both parties, especially considering that a direct relationship seemed highly unlikely in the past. What paved the way for this “surprise” was the situation inside Turkey itself. Specifically, the reconciliation between the PKK and the Turkish government has been the major factor pushing forward this direct engagement between the SDF and Ankara.
What are the implications and consequences of raising the level of communication between the SDF and Turkey at this stage?
One of the most significant implications is the shift in the way issues along the Syrian–Turkish border are being handled, particularly concerning Kurds coming from Europe through Turkey toward Syria. I believe that Turkey at this moment does not want any conflict on this front. In contrast, Ankara had always spoken of its national security being under threat. This is no longer the case since the PKK has laid down its arms, creating a domestic political reconciliation in Turkey. As a result, the Turkish government must now reconsider its former policies in the region, which focused on Arabization of the Kurds and their removal from border areas. It is almost certain that this dialogue will lead to economic revival and greater ease of movement between Turkey and the regions of northern and eastern Syria.
Can there be a bilateral agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey outside the framework of the Syrian government?
I do not believe there will be a bilateral agreement between the SDF and Turkey outside the Syrian government. However, this does not preclude cooperation between Kurdish regions in Syria and Turkey. I think the central authority in Syria is aware of Turkey’s engagement with the SDF. Based on the political reality, Turkey cannot distance itself from the Syrian government under the leadership of Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom it supported in the past. Therefore, agreements are possible, but only at a “narrow level” between the SDF and Turkey.
Can the SDF gain more benefits from its engagement with Ankara than from its negotiations with Damascus?
Major benefits would come from direct relations. I expect there will be such a direct relationship, with Turkey appointing an official to manage communication with the Kurds in Syria. This is extremely important, and at the same time both Presidents al-Sharaa and Erdoğan would act as sponsors of this process. Turkey, which has repeatedly emphasized its support for Syria’s unity, is not opposed to decentralization. The key issue is that Damascus may overlook certain matters if an agreement is reached between Turkey and the SDF. The main challenge remains the military establishment and the principle of unified leadership in the Syrian army. Previously, the Syrian government had prepared for a military operation in northeastern Syria with Turkish support. At present, however, I believe circumstances have changed following political shifts inside Turkey. In my view, the greatest gain the SDF could achieve is the restoration of areas in northern Syria that were subject to Arabization.
Do you think pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey play an effective role in mediating between the SDF and Ankara?
I do not think so. Despite the concessions made by Kurds in Turkey, the Turkish government is still not ready to accept the existence of a unified Kurdish leadership. This may happen in the distant future, but at present it remains difficult. It is not in the SDF’s interest for Kurdish parties in Turkey to support it or to act as intermediaries in negotiations with Ankara. What is needed now is the establishment of trust between the SDF and Turkish authorities. This can be achieved by assigning a Kurdish figure from Turkish political parties as a liaison between the two sides.
Is direct communication between the SDF and Turkey an extension of negotiations with the Syrian government, or the result of their failure?
If we go back to the early hours and days following the fall of the deposed regime, it was clear that everything unfolded to the benefit of Turkey and with its support. Later, the balance in relations between Turkey and Syria was disrupted. It is important to acknowledge that there are differences in certain files between Damascus and Ankara, given that their interests are not identical. President al-Sharaa is currently striving to preserve the unity of the country and to affirm that there will be no quota system in the state. Instead, he seeks appropriate local representation for all Syrian components in government institutions and to begin reconstruction. Since the start of the popular movement, the Syrian Democratic Forces have managed to build both military and civil institutions and to establish global Kurdish networks. This should be a positive factor. The SDF is now capable of assisting the government in many matters related to security, the military, and cooperation with Western countries. It is also essential to resolve all disputes between the Autonomous Administration and the government by ensuring that Kurds have proper representation befitting their role in Syria.
