Cairo’s decision in 2013 to ban the Muslim Brotherhood and classify it as a “terrorist organization” in December of that same year was not the first time the group had faced state prohibition, whether before or after the July 1952 Revolution. However, it was the first time such a decision came after the Muslim Brotherhood had actually held the reins of power for a full year.
This turning point followed the events of January 2011 and Egypt’s subsequent presidential elections, which resulted in the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi. Yet Egyptian society, clinging in that exceptional moment to its deep national heritage, confronted the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempts to impose their ideology on state institutions and tighten its grip on power. Anger spilled into the streets in massive demonstrations on June 30, 2013, demanding the fall of the group.
That watershed moment in Egypt’s modern history revealed the Muslim Brotherhood’s true orientations, namely the embrace of violence and organized terrorism against police and army leaders across the country, particularly in North Sinai.
The Moment of Change
In this context, Emad Abdel-Hafez, a researcher on Islamist movements, notes that the January revolution was itself a surprise to the Muslim Brotherhood, since revolution was never part of the roadmap laid out by the group’s founder, Hassan al-Banna. His project was structured around specific goals, stages, and mechanisms that did not include revolution as an option.
Speaking to +963, Abdel-Hafez explains that the Muslim Brotherhood perceived the revolution as a historic opportunity that allowed them to skip several stages of their long-term project, believing the time for governance and empowerment had arrived. Capitalizing on their organizational preparedness and broad social base, and amid the weakness of civil parties and other political currents, the group sought to dominate both legislative and executive power. This, he argues, was the first and most significant driver of their push for rule.
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The second factor, he continues, lies in the Muslim Brotherhood’s self-image and perception of others. The group viewed itself as the most qualified to lead, presenting itself as the bearer of the “Islamic project” in contrast to secular and civil forces. It also believed its project represented the true expression of Islam, even in comparison with other Islamist movements.
A third factor was the Brotherhood’s persistent fear of repression, rooted in its history of clashes with successive regimes. The group assumed that if someone outside their ranks came to power, they would once again be subjected to persecution, even to the extent of fearing the rise of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, once one of their most prominent leaders, to the presidency.
Abdel-Hafez cautions, however, that despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational strength and mass base, their success and survival in power required other prerequisites they did not possess. They lacked the necessary experience in statecraft and the ability to manage relations, whether internally with state institutions and opposition forces, or externally with regional and international actors.
Most importantly, he argues, the Muslim Brotherhood’s downfall stemmed from its very nature: its sense of superiority, its detachment from the national framework, and its transnational project that denied the legitimacy of the nation-state. In a country the size of Egypt, this was perceived as a threat to the state itself, making their fall from power inevitable.
He stresses that the Muslim Brotherhood’s time in power also reshaped societal attitudes toward them. Their governance exposed the flaws embedded in their rhetoric, ideas, and project.
Even after their ouster, their handling of the ensuing conflict highlighted the contradictions between their declared discourse and actual practices. Though they claimed to be a peaceful group committed to gradual reform and political participation, events demonstrated that violence and the use of force remained among their enduring options.
It is telling, he adds, that the Brotherhood did not dissolve itself after January 2011. On the contrary, then-Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie called for the establishment of a political party, Freedom and Justice, with Saad al-Katatni appointed as deputy founder.
Yet on August 9, 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court ordered the dissolution of the party, liquidation of its assets, and transfer of its funds to the state.
A Cumulative Strategy
For his part, Mounir Adeeb, a researcher specializing in extremist movements and international terrorism, emphasizes that the Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt was not accidental, but rather the product of a cumulative strategy rooted in the idea of transnationalism. This strategy began with shaping the individual, the family, and society, ultimately aiming to build an Islamic state and restore the caliphate.
Speaking to +963, Adeeb notes that whether through the organization itself or its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, the Brotherhood after 2011 sought not merely to participate in politics but to politicize the state itself and subject its institutions to the movement’s vision.
He explains that the group operated along two parallel tracks: the missionary path through recruitment and ideological influence, and the charitable path through social activities. Yet in both cases, the ultimate goal remained the same, gaining control over the levers of society and using that as a springboard to power.
According to Adeeb, their post-2011 experience revealed the Muslim Brotherhood’s true political face. They treated Egypt, a state with millennia of history, as little more than a branch of their organization. They lacked the expertise, failed to grasp the requirements of governance, and could not reconcile themselves with the notion of the nation-state.
He concludes: “The Muslim Brotherhood’s fall in Egypt was as rapid as its rise. They rushed toward power like a car speeding uphill, but no sooner had they reached the summit than they plunged down toward proscription and designation as a terrorist group.”
