Tarek Aziza
Despite the stark ideological differences between the former Syrian regime and the current transitional authority led by Ahmad al-Shara’, striking similarities have begun to emerge in their modes of governance. From the outset, the newly issued constitutional declaration has raised concerns, concentrating even more power in the hands of the president than Bashar al-Assad’s constitution did, without establishing mechanisms for accountability or oversight. Exclusionary policies have resurfaced, deepening religious, sectarian, and tribal divisions at the expense of inclusive citizenship.
Syrian political and civil forces had hoped to be integral to the transitional phase, helping to lay the foundations for good governance and modern state institutions. However, factional and familial loyalties have reasserted themselves. Al-Sharaa has entrusted key military, security, and administrative appointments to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has essentially become the regime’s “leading party,” reminiscent of the Ba’ath Party’s dominance, now rebranded as the “Political Affairs Authority” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates.
Furthermore, high-level government positions have been awarded to Al-Shara’s own relatives: his brother Maher was appointed Minister of Health and later Secretary-General of the Presidency; another brother, Hazem, heads the Investment Authority; and his brother-in-law, Maher Marwan, was named Governor of Damascus. Although his eldest brother, Jamal Al-Shara’, holds no formal position, his public appearance alongside the Minister of Culture as guests at a prominent tribal leader, this leader had ties to the former Assad regime and Iranian-backed militias, raised suspicions. Fighters loyal to that same tribal leader later took part in an armed assault on Suweyda.
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What many Syrians believed to be a relic of the Assad era, the sectarian massacres and gross human rights violations, has returned in the so-called “new Syria.” Following a failed armed uprising by Assad loyalists in Syria’s coastal region this past March, during which dozens of security personnel were killed, sweeping retaliatory attacks were carried out against Alawite civilians. Human rights organizations and media reports documented the killing of over 1,500 people by factions aligned with the transitional authority, including rogue militias. More recently, in July, violent clashes erupted between local Druze factions and Bedouin fighters in Suwayda province. Forces from the Interior and Defense Ministries intervened, only to withdraw after Israeli airstrikes. This paved the way for thousands of tribal fighters to flood the area, resulting in mass executions, abductions, looting, and arson, scenes eerily reminiscent of the most horrific moments of Syria’s civil war.
Amidst this bloodshed, a report was released by the presidential committee tasked with investigating the “coastal events.” Its conclusions appeared to absolve the authorities, emphasizing that fighters had disobeyed orders, some commanders had tried to stop the violations, and that the undisciplined nature of participating militias made control difficult. It’s worth noting that international human rights organizations had previously expressed scepticism about the committee’s independence and impartiality. Regardless of whether the authorities were directly complicit or simply failed to prevent these atrocities, they were unable to fulfill their most basic function: to protect citizens’ lives.
This situation aligns with what political science and international relations literature defines as a “failed state”, a country unable to perform essential state functions. Such states lose effective control over parts of their territory, lack representative legitimacy, and see the rule of law collapse in favour of military or factional rule. National cohesion disintegrates into sectarianism and localism, reducing the state to a fragile shell where official authorities are nominally in charge, but real power lies with militias often backed by foreign actors. These characteristics are all present in Syria today. The transitional authority has failed to assert full territorial control, and it has ceded sovereignty externally, submitting to the will of regional and international powers, and internally by relying on armed groups outside state structures, which have fuelled chaos, violence, and societal fragmentation.
As the transitional government remains unable to impose the rule of law or protect its citizens, Syria is inching closer to the designation of a failed state, not as a theoretical label, but as a lived reality for its people. The violence in the coastal regions and in Suweyda may well repeat itself elsewhere and against other segments of the population if the current reckless policies continue. Worsening the crisis is the stark disconnect between state-run media, which extols the glory and dignity of the “Syrian state,” and the grim, deteriorating security, economic, and social realities on the ground, mirroring the propaganda playbook of the Assad regime, where dissent is vilified and narratives are tightly controlled.
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This is not simply a scathing indictment of those in power, it is a diagnosis of a political, economic, and social crisis that places Syria and its people on the brink of total collapse. The situation poses a serious threat not only to regional but also to international peace and stability. Addressing this crisis requires a multifaceted strategy: effective international support, genuine internal reforms, and an inclusive national dialogue to rebuild the state and restore a unified national identity.
The Syrian revolution was never merely a rebellion against Assad’s tyranny and corruption. It was a dream of a modern state that restores dignity and truly represents all its citizens. Syria’s only path out of failure lies in abandoning the factional mindset and the cult of the “infallible leader,” and instead establishing a democratic social contract, one that guarantees participation, accountability, justice, and equality for all.
