{"id":39530,"date":"2025-09-06T20:15:53","date_gmt":"2025-09-06T20:15:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/963media.com\/en\/?p=39530"},"modified":"2025-10-26T13:08:52","modified_gmt":"2025-10-26T13:08:52","slug":"turkey-and-syrias-kurds-from-hostility-toward-possible-partnership","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/963media.com\/en\/06\/09\/2025\/turkey-and-syrias-kurds-from-hostility-toward-possible-partnership\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey and Syria\u2019s Kurds: From Hostility Toward Possible Partnership"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sarkis Kassarjian<\/b><\/p>\n

Turkey has long sought to realize its vision of a \u201cTurkey free of terrorism,\u201d but this ambition collides with the complex realities along its southern border. Despite years of military operations in northern Syria, Ankara has failed to eliminate the presence of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a force many Syrian Kurds, and other opponents of Islamist centralism, view as existential to their survival.<\/span><\/p>\n

The challenge extends beyond Syria\u2019s geography into Turkey\u2019s domestic arena. Peace efforts face serious internal obstacles. Opposition parties such as the Good Party, Homeland Party, and Victory Party exploit anti-Kurdish sentiment, warning against any \u201cconcessions\u201d on Syria.<\/span><\/p>\n

Military campaigns cost Turkey an estimated $15.6 billion annually, draining its already fragile economy. Critics argue this money could instead support development in Turkey\u2019s southeast, where unemployment reaches 28%, fuelling resentment among Kurdish youth.<\/span><\/p>\n

Iraq\u2019s Model as Inspiration<\/b><\/h2>\n

Ankara once viewed Iraq\u2019s Kurdistan Region as an enemy. Today, it is a partner, bound by mutual oil trade, political cooperation, and security ties. Many Turkish voices now suggest a similar formula may be possible with the SDF in Syria.<\/span><\/p>\n

Proposals include creating joint economic zones along the border to generate jobs and reduce the appeal of armed groups. Others envision extending Ankara\u2019s pipeline projects to link Kurdish energy interests with Turkey\u2019s regional energy strategy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Also read: Kurdish-led SDF and Turkey: Between Political Maturity and Fragile Implementation<\/a>
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The Nationalist Opening<\/b><\/h2>\n

A surprising development has been calls for Turkish-Kurdish reconciliation from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), one of Turkey\u2019s most hardline parties. Its leader, Devlet Bah\u00e7eli, warned that unresolved Kurdish issues, inside Turkey and across the border, would only deepen Ankara\u2019s vulnerabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Bah\u00e7eli pointed to the March 10, 2025 Agreement between the Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, a framework seeking to integrate SDF fighters into the Syrian army and return their territories to Damascus, as a potential key to defusing the crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

For Bah\u00e7eli, the Kurdish question is not simply a local dispute but a three-dimensional challenge:<\/span><\/p>\n

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  1. Ideological ties between the PKK in Turkey and the SDF\u2019s backbone, the People\u2019s Protection Units (YPG). Many in Turkey\u2019s DEM Party still treat imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah \u00d6calan as a red line, complicating peace.<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. Israeli influence, underscored by Prime Minister Netanyahu\u2019s open support for Kurdish self-rule.<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Firm U.S. backing of the SDF as a frontline ally in the war against ISIS.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Regional Tensions<\/b><\/h2>\n

    Meanwhile, Israel has escalated its military operations in Syria, moving deeper into its territory and threatening to weaken Turkey\u2019s leverage in the south. Ankara, in turn, has stepped up support for Syria\u2019s transitional government, on condition it pledges to fight \u201cseparatist groups.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

    Turkey\u2019s hostility toward the SDF is driven by three overlapping concerns:<\/span><\/p>\n