By Rasha Omran
As expected, the recent Syrian Dialogue Conference did not meet the expectations of the Syrian people. In fact, criticism and mockery dominated social media discussions as soon as the event was announced. This reaction is not new—since the 2011 revolution, no significant Syrian event has escaped negative feedback. Every opposition conference held in the years following the revolution has faced sharp criticism, with its members subjected to ridicule and verbal attacks.
This discontent is often not due to the conference itself but rather begins the moment it is announced, long before any official statements, decisions, or outcomes are presented. The underlying issue is a deep-rooted mistrust—Syrians, having been deprived of political and collective participation for so long, struggle to trust any assembly where they do not see themselves represented. Conspiracy theories are readily invoked, and this political scepticism has weakened Syria’s civil revolutionary movement, preventing it from gaining a strong foothold within the opposition’s political landscape. Most independent activists lack a strong popular base to defend them against criticism, forcing many to retreat from political engagement altogether, limiting themselves to individual writing or passive observation.
However, the recent National Dialogue Conference differs from previous opposition conferences in keyways. It is the first to take place after the fall of the regime and Bashar al-Assad’s escape, the first to be held in Damascus, and the first meant to discuss Syria’s future, the structure of the new state, and the foundations of the upcoming political phase. This phase is expected to result in a comprehensive national unity government—a necessary step before the international community considers lifting sanctions—replacing the current Islamist-led government, which many Syrians feel does not represent them. Critics argue that this government is attempting to impose a rigid ideology on all Syrians, disregarding the country’s historically moderate Islamic identity, which has long been in harmony with neighbouring nations.
However, the events surrounding this conference came as a shock to both Syrians at home and abroad. The problems started with the selection of the organizing committee. Except for one female member, all seven members of the committee were affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), sharing the same ideological framework. None of them represented areas formerly under Assad’s control, and all either lived in Idlib or outside Syria, completely disconnected from the complex realities on the ground. This was evident in their poorly planned and rushed meetings across various Syrian cities and provinces, which failed to include independent national figures or acknowledge local specificities. The situation was particularly scandalous in the eastern provinces, where the committee refused to travel, instead summoning selected individuals to Damascus for sessions that not all committee members even attended.
Then, without warning, the conference date was announced just two days before it was set to take place—before preparatory sessions had even concluded and before invitations had been properly issued. With no official state media coverage and only scattered, unreliable reports, many doubted whether the conference was real at all. Meanwhile, social media influencers—particularly TikTok figures—boasted about their invitations, while prominent Syrian intellectuals, political figures, and thinkers who played key roles in post-liberation reconciliation efforts were excluded.
For Syrians abroad, it was as if they had been stripped of their citizenship altogether. The committee made no effort to consult them, despite the availability of online communication tools that could have easily facilitated Zoom meetings between internal and external actors. Instead, no political figures, intellectuals, activists, or artists from outside Syria were invited until mere hours before the conference, leaving many unable to attend due to short notice, high travel costs, or visa complications.
Favouritism in the invitation process was further exposed when Zaman Al-Wasl, a Syrian news outlet, leaked the list of attendees. The report revealed that four participants were from a single family related to a committee member. Meanwhile, Idlib had 70 representatives, while a major city like Latakia, along with its surrounding areas, had only four. Female participation was also notably low, with women making up less than 20% of attendees. When questioned about this, a female committee member gave a shocking justification, claiming that selections were based on “competence” rather than gender quotas.
All of this created the impression that the primary goal of the conference was simply to announce its existence, rather than to foster genuine dialogue. Invitations outlined rigid discussion topics and limited speaking times, raising serious doubts about the sincerity of the event. Is this truly how a national conference should be held in a country that has suffered 14 years of war? A country devastated by an unprecedentedly brutal regime, economic collapse, social and humanitarian crises, cultural and educational disintegration, armed factions, widespread weapons stockpiles, mass graves, millions of refugees in dire conditions, daily Israeli attacks, territorial occupation, and severe international sanctions? Does this not raise serious concerns about the competence of those now in power?
Syria has endured years of war, political stagnation that prevented the formation of parties and civil organizations, and sectarian divisions that nearly escalated into full-scale civil war. Today, inflammatory rhetoric still threatens what remains of the country’s fragile social peace. Addressing this deeply complex reality requires extended, inclusive, and structured dialogues. These discussions must involve ordinary citizens, newly emerging civil organizations, nascent political parties, local communities, intellectuals, businessmen, investors, and even former adversaries—ensuring that at least half of the participants are women, representing all segments of Syrian society.
These dialogues should cover critical issues such as transitional justice, institutional rebuilding, individual and collective freedoms, economic and cultural policies, freedom of artistic expression, and the foundational principles for a constitutional declaration. Only after these discussions are fully realized should a national conference be convened to establish clear and final principles for drafting a new constitution—the true beginning of rebuilding a legitimate state.
What took place a few days ago, unfortunately, was not just a disappointment for Syrians but a revival of the same system that ruled Syria under Assad. The primary goal appeared to be gaining international recognition rather than addressing the needs of the Syrian people. It is as if Syria is doomed to be governed by those who seek legitimacy from external powers rather than from within. The new rulers, through this hollow conference, seem intent on shaping a “useful Syria” for their own benefit—much like the one was for Assad.
And they may very well succeed. Many Syrians remain trapped in Assad’s legacy—instinctively glorifying any leader, no matter how oppressive. Some continue to shower those in power with praise, hoping to secure personal benefits.
However, the long-oppressed and marginalized groups in Syria, having endured repeated betrayal and exclusion, are simmering with suppressed anger. If the new government continues down this path of marginalization and exclusion, this frustration will inevitably erupt—perhaps with an intensity no one anticipates. There are no limits to the fury of those who have been repeatedly wronged and abandoned.
